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ARISING FROM THE DEAD: CHALLENGES OF
POSTHUMOUS PROCREATION
ANNE REICHMAN ScHIFF*
The medical capabilities derived from modem reproductive
technology, such as in vitro fertilization and cryopreservation,
have enabled physicians and scientists to intervene in the
procreative process in innumerable ways. However, this
intervention in the natural reproductive process raises both moral
and legal concerns. In this Article, Professor Schiff explores some
of the conflicts that may result when an individual or couple elects
to cryopreserve gametes or embryos and subsequently, one or
both of the contributors dies, or when gametes are harvested from
a dead body. This Article will specifically address the moral and
legal responses to circumstances where the decedent has either
clearly expressed opposition to posthumous use of the
reproductive material or else the decedent's intent regarding
posthumous use of the material is ambiguous. By discussing
philosophical and moral positions relating to personhood and the
body and analyzing legal issues such as reproductive choice and
organ donation, Professor Schiff creates the necessary format to
examine and recommend the proper legal treatment of this
controversial aspect of posthumous procreation.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout human history, death has always signified an awe-
some finality. The conclusive demise of the body necessarily led to
the concomitant extinguishing of the procreative process. Notions of
an afterlife or reincarnation aside, the grave signified the end of all
human endeavors, and procreation constituted no exception. While
posthumous reproduction has often occurred in circumstances where
one or both parents died before a child was born,' conception after
death, until recently, was unimaginable. Today, the ability to freeze
and store reproductive material2 and to harvest gametes3 from dead
1. The father may die during the mother's pregnancy, or the mother may die during
childbirth. See John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1027
(1994). In addition, brain-dead pregnant women may be maintained on life-support sys-
tems long enough to deliver a viable fetus. See id, at 1051-64. However, this Article is
confined to issues arising when conception, or implantation of an embryo, takes place
after death.
2. Sperm and embryos can be cryopreserved in liquid nitrogen and subsequently
thawed. While the freeze-thaw process presents more of a challenge with eggs due to the
relatively large size of the egg and its delicate chromosomal structure, some success has
been reported. See Steve Dow, World First as Melbourne Egg Bank is Opened, THE AGE,
Feb. 6, 1996, at A4 ("Researchers... say their technology is the first shown to be
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bodies4 has made posthumous conception a reality.'
Posthumous procreation may come about in a number of differ-
ent circumstances. In some cases, reproduction after death may have
been specifically desired by the decedent. For example, in Hecht v.
Superior Court (Kane),6 William Kane's intention to procreate post-
humously was absolutely clear. In preparation for his suicide, Kane
deposited fifteen vials of his sperm at a sperm bank.7 He expressed a
wish, in both a "Specimen Storage Agreement" and in his will, that
after his death the sperm should be released to Deborah Hecht, a
safe. ... [The technique] has also shown that freezing does not affect the eggs' cellular
integrity-indicating that healthy IVF embryos should develop."). See generally OFFICE
OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES
127-28 (1988) (describing techniques for gamete and embryo cryopreservation)
[hereinafter INFERTILITY].
3. A "gamete" is defined as "either the male sex or reproductive cell (i.e., the sper-
matozoon) or the female sex or reproductive cell (the ovum) which, upon uniting with the
cell of the opposite sex, is capable of forming a new organism." J.E. SCHMIDT, AT-
TORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER G-9 (1996).
4. See infra notes 258-69 and accompanying text.
5. Although the following is not intended to be an exhaustive list, scholarly litera-
ture in the area includes: Rosalind F. Atherton, Artificially Conceived Children and
Inheritance in New South Wales, 60 AUSTL. L.J. 374 (1986); Barry Brown, Reconciling
Property Law with Advances in Reproductive Science, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 73
(1995); Lisa M. Burkdall, A Dead Man's Tale: Regulating the Right to Bequeath Sperm in
California, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 875 (1995); Fred H. Cate, Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics:
Posthumous Autonomy Revisited, 69 IND. L.J. 1067 (1994); Ronald Chester, Freezing the
Heir Apparent A Dialogue on Postmortem Conception, Parental Responsibility, and In-
heritance, 33 HOuS. L. REV. 967 (1996); Paul Coelus, Inheritance Problems of Frozen
Embryos (The Child En Ventre Sa Frigidaire), 7 PROB. L.J. 119 (1986); Christine A.
Djalleta, A Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Probate
Code in Light of New Reproductive Technology, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 335 (1994); Ellen J.
Garside, Posthumous Progeny: A Proposed Resolution to the Dilemma of the Posthu-
mously Conceived Child, 41 Loy. L. REv. 713 (1996); Sheri Gilbert, Fatherhood From the
Grave: An Analysis of Postmortem Insemination, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521 (1993); Derek
J. Jones, Artificial Procreation, Societal Reconceptions: Legal Insight From France, 36
AM. J. COMp. L. 525 (1988); Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, From Cradle to Tomb: Estate
Planning Considerations of the New Procreation, 57 LA. L. REv. 27 (1996); W. Barton
Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the Fertile Decedent, 48
A.B.A. J. 942 (1962); David A. Rameden, Frozen Semen as Property in Hecht v. Superior
Court: One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward, 62 UMKC L. REV. 377 (1994); Robert-
son, supra note 1; Live Sperm, Dead Bodies, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at
33 (commentaries by Cappy Miles Rothman and Judith Wilson Ross); Carolyn Sappideen,
Life After Death: Sperm Banks, Wills and Perpetuities, 53 AUsSTL. L.J. 311 (1979); E.
Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-
mortem Insemination, 1 J. L. & HEALTH 229 (1986-87); Michael H. Shapiro, Illicit Rea-
sons and Means for Reproduction: On Excessive Choice and Categorical and
Technological Imperatives, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1081, 1127-34 (1996); Bonnie Steinbock,
Sperm as Property, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 57 (1995).
6. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993).
7. See id. at 276.
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woman with whom he had been living for about five years, so that she
could impregnate herself if she so desired.8 Kane's existing children
brought suit for the destruction of the sperm.9 The California Court
of Appeal held that a decedent's interest in his frozen sperm was
"property' over which the probate court had jurisdiction, and that
"at the time of his death, decedent had an interest, in the nature of
ownership, to the extent that he had decision-making authority as to
the use of his sperm for reproduction."1  The court considered
whether the bequest of this property to the deceased's lover for her
impregnation contravened public policy because of her status as an
unmarried woman and concluded that it did not." A California supe-
rior court probate judge awarded Hecht three of the fifteen vials of
sperm in accordance with a settlement agreement which provided
that Hecht was to receive twenty percent of the estate's residual
"assets." On appeal, the California Court of Appeal held that the
sperm was not an "asset" of the estate which could be distributed in a
manner inconsistent with the testator's intent, and that Kane's clear
intent was that Hecht should be artificially inseminated with his
sperm.
Many legal and social policy questions are raised by situations
such as that in Hecht, where a person explicitly authorizes posthu-
mous procreation. For example, various state interests, such as the
interest in protecting the psychological and financial well-being of the
resulting child and the interest in protecting state revenues must be
weighed against the individual's interest in reproducing after death.
The applicability of current laws relating to survivors' benefits, 3 in-
& See id. at 276-77.
9. See id. at 279.
10. Id. at 283.
11. See id. at 284-87. For an account of the extraordinary life (and death) of William
Kane, see Burkdall, supra note 5, at 875-77; see also Hall v. Fertility Inst., 647 So. 2d 1348,
1351 (La. 1994) (holding that the validity of an act of donation executed by the deceased
eleven months before his death, purporting to convey his interest in frozen sperm samples
to a female friend in consideration of his "love and affection" for her, depended upon the
deceased's competency and intention at the time of execution).
12. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1289, 1295-97 (Ct. App. 1996).
13. See Chester, supra note 5, at 988-90. Professor Chester discusses the details of a
recent Louisiana case, Hart v. Shalala, No. 94-3944 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 1994), which ad-
dressed the issue of whether a child, Judith Hart, conceived through the process of in vitro
fertilization after her father's death, was entitled to Social Security survivor's benefits.
See Chester, supra note 5, at 988. Under the state intestacy laws, Judith would be re-
quired to show that she was in existence at the time of her father's death. See il at 990.
After extensive litigation, however, the case was settled and the Social Security Admini-
stration granted her survivor's benefits. See id. at 988-89; see also Benefits Awarded to In
Vitro Child, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at A8; Social Security Case on Date of Girl's Con-
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heritance and support14 must be examined. Furthermore, considera-
tion of the appropriate limits of "dead hand" control in matters of
procreation leads to questions concerning whether and how the Rule
Against Perpetuities might apply in this context."
This Article, however, is concerned not with the right to procre-
ate posthumously, but with the right to avoid posthumous
procreation. It focuses on situations where a surviving family mem-
ber wishes to procreate using the deceased's gametes or embryos,
under circumstances where the deceased, while alive, did not give
express authorization for this course of action. In some cases, the
deceased may have made very clear his or her objection to posthu-
mous reproduction, and a surviving family member may nevertheless
wish to use the deceased's reproductive material for procreation de-
spite the deceased's known objection. In other situations, evidence
regarding the deceased's wishes for, or objections to, posthumous
procreation may be either wholly or partially lacking. A person's in-
tentions concerning posthumous procreation may in many-if not
most-cases be far less explicit than those of William Kane. For ex-
ample, uncertainty as to intentions can arise when individuals or
couples decide to store their gametes or embryos not for another's
use after their death, but rather for their own use at some future
point. They may, for instance, decide to freeze their reproductive
material in anticipation of an event which they know or fear will have
an adverse effect upon their procreative potential, such as exposure
to radiation or to hazardous chemicals." If the individual or couple
ception is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1996, at A13.
14. For a discussion of inheritance and support claims in posthumous reproduction,
see Burkdall, supra note 5, at 889-97; Chester, supra note 5, at 1012-19; Coelus, supra note
5, at 130-43; Djalleta, supra note 5, at 364-70; Garside, supra note 5, passim; Gilbert, su-
pra note 5, at 555-58; and Lorio, supra note 5, at 45-53.
15. See Leach, supra note 5, at 944. Leach suggests that the law should be flexible
enough to adapt itself to the changing circumstances brought about by sperm banks, and
that "the duration of a male 'life in being' under the Rule Against Perpetuities should be
defined as the period of his reproductive capacity, including any post-mortem period
during which his sperm remains fertile." Id. See generally Sappideen, supra note 5, at 314-
16 (offering examples of how posthumous procreation complicates Rule Against Perpe-
tuities issues).
16. See Leach, supra note 5, at 943 (stating that the original impetus for sperm cryo-
preservation in the 1960s was "to protect the issue of the astronauts from mutations
resulting from ionizing radiation in space"); Elizabeth Kurylo, Some GIs Hedging Their
Future-Firms Get New Customers as Troops March Off to War, ATLANTA J., Feb. 6,
1991, at A7 (noting that while a number of soldiers who are reported to have deposited
sperm samples with sperm banks before departing for the Gulf War did so because they
feared death, the motivation for others was a concern that chemical warfare would leave
them unable to conceive healthy children); GI's Told: We Want You For Birth Control-
Father of "the Pill" Proposes Use of Military Volunteers for Long-Term Test of Frozen
1997]
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dies, leaving behind frozen gametes or embryos, and a family mem-
ber or lover requests access to this material for posthumous
procreation,17 should the fact of cryopreservation by itself constitute
evidence as to whether the deceased desired or even contemplated
reproduction after death?
Furthermore, medical advances that enable physicians to harvest
gametes from dead bodies raise issues concerning the fights and in-
terests of a decedent's family members. For example, should a
surviving family member be permitted to have a deceased's gametes
removed for reproductive purposes when there is no evidence that
the deceased would have authorized this procedure? In several re-
ported instances this request has been made and granted, following
the unexpected death of a male family member or lover.8 It may also
Sperm, S.F. EXAMINER, July 7, 1994, at A4 (suggesting that the military should supply
volunteers for an experiment using cryopreservation of sperm as a form of birth control,
whereby men could store sperm for later use before undergoing vasectomies); Craig A.
Winkel & Gregory T. Fossum, Current Reproductive Technology: Considerations for the
Oncologist, 7 ONCOLOGY 40, 40 (1993) (describing techniques for sperm and embryo
cryopreservation and suggesting that these options may benefit cancer patients undergo-
ing treatment likely to destroy testicular or ovarian function).
17. See, e.g., Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 5, at 229-33. Shapiro and Sonnen-
blick discuss a prominent French case, Parpalaix v. CECOS, T.G.I. Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984,
Gazette du Palais [G.P.], Sept. 15, 1984, at 11, in which the decedent deposited sperm in a
sperm bank in anticipation of chemotherapy treatment. See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, su-
pra note 5, at 229. The tribunal ordered the deposited sperm to be released to the widow
upon her request despite the lack of a written declaration as to the decedent's intent, on
the basis of testimony by the decedent's parents and wife that the decedent had wished
"to make his wife the mother of a common child," and that his marriage two days before
his death was evidence of this desire. See id. at 232; see also Widow Loses Court Fight to
Obtain Frozen Embryo, BUFF. NEWS, May 12, 1993, at 2 (discussing how a French court
refused a widow's request for the release of two frozen embryos which she wished to have
implanted, reasoning that the contract signed by the husband and wife prior to his death
stated that the embryos were to be destroyed if the marriage ended for any reason); Ann
Pepper, Man Wants Surrogate to Carry Grandchild: He's Determined to Hold Dead
Daughter's Baby, MORNING NEWS (Dallas), Dec. 20, 1996, at A37 (describing couple's
quest to find a surrogate mother to bear the child of their deceased daughter, whose eggs
had been fertilized with donor sperm and frozen prior to her treatment for leukemia);
Patricia Reaney, British Widow Wins Fight to Have Husband's Baby, REUTER'S WORLD
SERVICE, Feb. 6, 1997 (describing a British court of appeals decision allowing a widow
access to her deceased husband's sperm despite the absence of his written consent to her
use of the sperm; the court ruled that the widow could not have the procedure performed
in Britain, but would have to go to Belgium for that purpose).
18. See, e.g., Ivor Davis, Posterity Insurance, AIDS, Infertility and Medical Advances
Have Given Sperm Banks a Run on Their Frozen Assets, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26, 1988, at 5-1
(discussing case in which a 15-year-old Los Angeles youth's sperm was extracted at his
family's request as he lay in a coma after being shot in a gang-related incident); Ike Flo-
res, Newlywed Dies in Crash, But Hopes for Children Live in Extracted Sperm, L.A.
TIMES, July 3, 1994, at A10 (reporting sperm extraction procedure performed on 22-year-
old Emanuele Maresca at his widow's request, after he was killed in a car accident 16 days
after their marriage); Maggie Gallagher, The Ultimate Deadbeat Dads, NEWSDAY, Feb. 1,
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be possible for egg-bearing ovarian tissue to be transplanted from a
dead woman to an infertile woman.9 Should the procreative wishes
of the living be fulfilled despite the absence of prior authorization by
the deceased?
This Article examines the competing interests at stake when a
surviving family member wishes to reproduce using the deceased's
gametes or embryos, in the face of the deceased's known objections
or unknown wishes." Part I examines the moral relationship between
personhood and the body.2' It explores views relating to the nature of
a person's interest in his or her gametes, or in an embryo created
from those gametes, and suggests that the characterization of this in-
terest is not self-evident, but rather is determined in large measure by
the desired legal consequence. Part II discusses the law's approach to
allocating decision-making authority between the individual, the
family and the state with respect to the disposition of corpses and the
donation of cadaveric organs, in order to examine whether the mod-
els that apply in those contexts are appropriate for posthumous
procreation.' Part III analyzes the concept of posthumous harm, and
maintains that an individual has interests which survive his or her
1995, at A28 (discussing sperm extraction from the body of 29-year-old Anthony Baez, at
his widow's request, after Baez died in police custody); Sperm Taken From Another Dead
Man, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 25, 1995, at A5 (reporting sperm harvested at widow's request
from a 34-year-old man killed in a car accident). See generally Live Sperm, Dead Bodies,
supra note 5, at 33-34 (presenting ethical positions for and against posthumous sperm
harvesting in circumstances where the deceased's wishes in this regard are unknown).
19. See Eugene Robinson, Furor Over Fertility Options: Should Eggs from Fetuses or
Cadavers be Used to Help Women Become Pregnant?, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1994, at Z6;
see also Gail Vines, Growing Human Eggs is "Tougher Than They Think," NEW SCI-
ENTIST, Jan. 15, 1994, at 7 (describing some practical difficulties associated with egg
removal after death). Moreover, since females are born with a lifetime supply of eggs,
egg retrieval may be feasible even from very young girls, whether alive or dead. See They
Are The Egg Men, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 1994, at 79, 80; see also Donor Cards Ex-
panded to Human Eggs, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 7, 1994, at 1A (describing debate
in Britain regarding the suggestion by British doctors that eggs may be taken after death
from girls as young as 12, when a donor card is signed before death).
Even more controversial is the specter of ovarian grafts from aborted fetuses to gen-
erate eggs for infertile women who have no viable eggs of their own. Since a ten-week-
old female fetus in utero already has a full complement of eggs, it may be possible to im-
plant a fetal ovary into an infertile woman. The ovary would then grow to adult size, and
the eggs would mature naturally. See Gina Kolata, Fetal Ovary Transplant is Envisioned,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1994, at A16. While the prospect of a genetic "parent" who has never
itself experienced independent existence raises fascinating legal and ethical questions, this
Article will deal only with issues involved in procreation beyond the grave.
20. For extensive treatment of this issue, see Robertson, supra note 1. Robertson's
views regarding the autonomy interests involved in posthumous reproduction are dis-
cussed and critiqued infra notes 248-78 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 26-115 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 116-199 and accompanying text.
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death, and that these interests can be either harmed or promoted
post-mortem.2 Part IV addresses circumstances where a surviving
family member wishes to harvest gametes from the deceased's body
or wishes to use the deceased's cryopreserved gametes, contrary to
the deceased's express wishes or in situations where little or no evi-
dence exists as to the deceased's wishes in this regard.24 Part V
concerns the disposition of extracorporeal embryos in circumstances
where one of the gamete providers dies, and the surviving partner
wishes to use the embryos for reproduction either knowing of the de-
ceased's explicit objection to such use or without clear evidence as to
the deceased's wishes.' The main contention of this Article is that
the right to avoid becoming a biological parent should generally be
respected after death as it is in life, and that infringing upon this in-
terest constitutes a serious violation of an individual's procreative
liberty.
I. THE NATURE OF REPRODUCTIVE MATERIAL
A. Perspectives on the Moral Significance of the Body and Its Parts
What is the nature of a person's interest in his or her reproduc-
tive material? This is the primary question to be considered in
evaluating the appropriateness of transmitting such material after
death. How we regard the essential connection of gametes and em-
bryos to the individual who generated them will significantly
influence our views as to the suitable handling and disposition of
these materials.
Modern medicine's ability to utilize body parts for a variety of
purposes has highlighted the potential value of these "spare parts.""
Blood can be used in transfusions,' many organs and tissues can be
transplanted from living or dead donors to save or enhance the qual-
ity of another's life,' cells can be extracted to form patentable cell-
23. See infra notes 200-47 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 248-84 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 285-329 and accompanying text.
26. See RUSSELL Scor, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 29-57 (1981) (describing the de-
mand for body parts in medical and economic terms).
27. See generally RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFr RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN
BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 15-30 (1971) (describing scientific advances and technical
problems in the field of blood transfusions).
28. See generally ROBERTA G. SIMMONS ET AL., GIFT OF LIFE: THE EFFECT OF
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION ON INDIVIDUAL, FAMILY, AND SOCIETAL DYNAMICS 83-84




lines,29 and gametes can be fertilized outside the body to create po-
tential human life.3 The recognition that body parts constitute a
medically useful resource leads us to reconsider how we ought to re-
gard these component parts. Are the products of our bodies
essentially tied to our personhood, or is our relationship to these
products in the nature of a somewhat more detached property inter-
est? If it is the latter, who has dominion over this property, and for
what purposes can the property be used?
31
Contemporary philosophers and bioethicists portray a range of
views concerning the interconnectedness of the body and its parts.32
Two contrasting positions are represented by Paul Ramsey and John
Fletcher. Ramsey, a Methodist theologian, regards bodily life as sa-
cred.33 In his view, respect for the sanctity of life implies respect for
the body,' and this respect is undermined when the body is
mechanistically reduced to its parts.35 Ramsey's concern for the in-
tegrity of the human body leads him to state that "we ought not to
begin to think of our bodies as an ensemble of parts left behind, like
old clothes, to be given away or taken or-worst of all sold. We are
the bodies we live."'' In Ramsey's view, "a human being has (or bet-
ter, is) a bodily integrity,"'37 and the respect owed to this physical
integrity means that "there are some actions that must be judged
wrong-even when they are embraced by a free and informed con-
29. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 n.2 (Cal. 1990); see
also infra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the Moore court's differentiation of
property rights in one's own body and property rights in the body of another).
30. See ANDREA BONNICKSEN, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: BUILDING POLICY FROM
LABORATORIES TO LEGISLATURES 147-51 (1989) (describing the in vitro fertilization
technique).
31. These questions are well articulated by Leon Kass in the following passage:
What kind of property is my body? Is it mine or is it me? Can it be alienated,
like my other property, like my car or even my dog? And on what basis do I
claim property rights in my body? Have I labored to produce it? Less than did
my mother, and yet it is not hers. Do I claim it on merit? Doubtful: I had it
even before I could be said to be deserving. Do I hold it as a gift-whether or
not there be a giver? How does one possess and use a gift? Is it mine to dispose
of as I wish-especially if I do not know the answer to these questions?
LEON R. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE 283 (1985).
32. See Thomas H. Murray, On the Human Body as Property: The Meaning of Em-
bodiment, Markets, and the Meaning of Strangers, 20 MICH. J.L. REFORM 1055, 1060-75
(1987) (describing legal and philosophical views on the moral significance of the body).
33. See PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON xiii (1970).
34. See id. at 208.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 207-08.
37. Id. at 190.
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sent... ."3 For example, Ramsey notes that a live individual donat-
ing his heart to save his child's life could still be a wrong act, even
though the donation is made with free and informed consent.39 As
regards cadaveric organ donation, Ramsey favors a system where in-
dividuals make an affirmative choice to donate their organs, rather
than a system where organs are routinely salvaged.' Expressing
strenuous opposition to monetary remuneration for cadaver organ
donation," Ramsey points to "the potentially dehumanizing abuses of
a market in human flesh."'42 His views as to the sacredness of the
body lead him to criticize those who see the body as "only a thing-in-
the-world to be subjected to limitless control,"43 and who conse-
quently celebrate every intervention which displays man's mastery
over the body.44
In contrast to the position taken by Ramsey is that adopted by
the Episcopalian theologian, Joseph Fletcher. According to Fletcher,
the body is relatively insignificant in defining personhood' Rather,
our moral stature lies in our capacity to exercise freedom and make
decisions regarding the terms of our health, life, and death.46 Dis-
cussing organ donation, Fletcher is critical of "[t]he popular tendency
... to combine vitalistic and organismic notions in the feeling that life
somehow depends on organic unity and integrity, and that therefore
personal identity or the soul does too"--a tendency which he sees as
partially responsible for what he terms "our shameful waste of hu-
man tissue."'  Fletcher is far more receptive to a social policy of
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 208-11.
41. See id. at 211-15.
42. Id. at 215 (citing Joshua Ledenberg, Biological Future of Man, in MAN AND HIS
FuTuRE 263,268 (G.E.W. Wolstenholme ed., 1963)).
43. Id. at 209.
44. See id.
45. Fletcher states: "To be a person, to have moral being, is to have the capacity for
intelligent causal action. It means to be free of physiology! It means to have selfness or
self-awareness. This is something that is not found in the body or in any of its organs."
JOSEPH F. FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE 218 (1972) [hereinafter FLETCHER,
MORALS]. Fletcher further developed his criteria for personhood in two of his articles.
See Joseph F. Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood.- A Tentative Profile of Man, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov. 1972, at 1; Joseph F. Fletcher, Four Indicators of Humanhood-the
Enquiry Matures, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1974, at 4.
46. See FLETCHER, MORALS, supra note 45, at 9-10.
47. Joseph Fletcher, Our Shameful Waste of Human Tissue: An Ethical Problem for
the Living and the Dead, in UPDATING LIFE AND DEATH 1, 4 (Donald R. Cutler ed.,
1969) [hereinafter Fletcher, Our Shameful Waste].
48. Id. at 27.
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organized organ giving than is Ramsey,49 emphasizing social conse-
quences as being more important than notions of individual freedoms
in life and death matters.!
Throughout his examination of contraception, sterilization, arti-
ficial insemination, and euthanasia, Fletcher celebrates choice,
knowledge of available courses of action, control, and responsibility
as essential qualities of moral being:
Choice and responsibility are the very heart of ethics, and
the sine qua non of a man's moral status. While it is true
that we have no responsibility for our own birth, and there-
fore no moral stake in it, we do have a moral stake in the
conception and birth of others, of those whom we bring. into
this world as we ourselves were brought. Life, health, and
death are therefore moral issues.1
Discussing the term "responsibility," Fletcher rejects the
"common notion" of the term as meaning "answerability-the will-
ingness or ability to be called to account." 2 Instead he proffers an
alternative interpretation: "The ability and willingness to respond to
human need, to answer a call for help in a concrete and particular
situation."'53 He concludes that "the phrase 'moral responsibility' is
essentially redundant, since to be moral or act morally is to be re-
sponsive to people."'  In Fletcher's view, the essence of our
humanness lies not in our corporeal selves, but in our ability to take
responsibility for choices that may transcend the natural limitations
of our bodies. To disregard the possibilities made available by tech-
nology and instead to succumb to a fatalistic attitude which sees
"natural" biological consequences as preordained is thus to compro-
mise the ethic of freedom within responsibility.55
Clearly, a range of perspectives exists concerning how the body
49. See id. Quoting Edwin Diamond with approval, Fletcher writes: "'Change seems
to come only when some determined health group publicizes its advantages and orches-
trates consent.'" Id.; cf. RAMSEY, supra note 33, at 209 (stating that "there is a real
danger that the organized giving of organs will only erode still more our apprehension
that man is a sacredness in the biological order. .. ").
50. See Fletcher, Our Shameful Waste, supra note 47, at 27 ("We might choose death
for ourselves more rightly than we can choose it for others. This is exactly what a refusal
or failure to be a donor, in one way or another, amounts to-choosing death for some-
body else.").
51. FLETCHER, MORALS, supra note 45, at 10.
52. Fletcher, Our Shameful Waste, supra note 47, at 12.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 11-14.
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and its parts are regarded." The location of an individual's views on
this spectrum may determine, to a large extent, that person's re-
sponses to many important ethical questions relating to treatment of
the body, not only in life, but also after death. As is evident from
contrasting the views of Ramsey and Fletcher, the conceptual lens
through which one views the body profoundly influences one's re-
sponses to questions such as whether the harvesting of bodily
materials from cadavers is consistent with the respect owed to the
dead, whether pre-mortem consent for the donation of organs and
tissues is required or should be presumed, and whether the legal re-
gime that governs such transfers should be one of gift or sale. Many
of these questions are pertinent not only to organ donation, but also
to posthumous procreation.
However, the position that a person holds with regard to these
issues in organ donation is not necessarily predictive of a person's
views regarding posthumous procreation. Although there are some
obvious analogies between cadaveric organ donation and posthu-
mous reproduction, there are also powerful distinctions, because
unlike other tissues and organs, reproductive material has the poten-
tial to produce human life. Indeed, because of the special quality of
reproductive material, it is unclear precisely how Ramsey or Fletcher
would view posthumous reproduction. While, according to Ramsey's
perspective, the harvesting of gametes from dead bodies would most
likely violate human dignity, it is not totally clear that Ramsey would
be opposed to posthumous procreation. On the one hand, he might
regard the use of gametes for procreation after death as destructive
of the fundamental identification of a person with his or her body.
On the other hand, he might celebrate this practice as essentially life-
affirming in its potential to create new human beings.
Similarly, Fletcher's position on posthumous procreation is not
altogether predictable. Under one interpretation, Fletcher might
welcome reproduction after death as an instance of technological
mastery which broadens the scope of available human choice over
the natural limitations that death otherwise imposes over procreative
plans. Moreover, he might view a system which inhibits the donation
of cadaveric reproductive material as unjustifiable wastage. On the
other hand, he might regard the donation of gametes to create a per-
56. For a review of some of these perspectives, see H. TRISTAM ENGELHARDT, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHIcs 104-47 (1986); KASS, supra note 31, at 276-98; Courtney S.
Campbell, Body, Self, and the Property Paradigm, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct.
1992, at 34, 34-40; William F. May, Religious Justifications for Donating Body Parts,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1985, at 38,38-39; and Murray, supra note 32, at 1060-75.
912 [Vol. 75
POSTHUMOUS PROCREATION
son as morally far less compelling than the donation of organs to save
the life of an already existing person. Furthermore, given Fletcher's
emphasis on moral responsibility, it is not clear that he would neces-
sarily confirm the wisdom of allowing procreation when there is no
possibility of the progenitor ever being held accountable for his pro-
creative decision.
Thus, while analysis of differing perspectives on the relationship
between the body and its parts provides some general guidance, it is
not dispositive of the issue as it relates to posthumous procreation.
In order to examine posthumous procreation, some of the general
principles that have influenced the thinking of writers such as Ram-
sey and Fletcher need to be applied. Most importantly, the
fundamental connection between our sense of self-identity, our
"humanness," and the posthumous use of our gametes and embryos
must be explored. To do so, we first need to focus on the nature of
reproductive material and its meaning to us. Thus, the next section
discusses how we view reproductive material and the uses to which
such material may be put. The specific question to be addressed is
whether sperm, eggs and embryos available after death should be
categorized as "property" or alternatively, whether they share attrib-
utes of "personhood," and what implications for posthumous
procreation flow from either of these characterizations.
B. Characterization of Interests in Gametes and Embryos
Analysis of the essential characteristics of reproductive material
is necessary in order to consider whether an individual has a right to
control the disposition of his or her gametes or embryos after death.
If reproductive material constitutes "property" forming part of the
deceased's estate, it may be bequeathed in the same way as other
personal property. However, if it is not characterized as "property,"
different rules may apply.
The legal concept of "property" is expansive, and includes far
more than the ownership of objects. A "property" interest is com-
monly said to signify a "bundle of legal rights"'57 that includes rights of
57. This metaphor has its origins in the writings of Wesley Hohfeld. See Wesley N.
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913). Although the term "bundle" was not used by Hohfeld, the meta-
phor of a "bundle of rights" or a "bundle of sticks" has featured prominently in the law.
See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928)
("The bundle of power and privileges to which we give the name of ownership is not con-
stant through the ages. The faggots must be put together and rebound from time to
time.").
1997] 913
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
possession, use, control, and disposition.8 As regards reproductive
material, a property right gives broad decision-making authority to
the individuals from whom the material originates, including the right
to "create, store, thaw, discard and donate [gametes and] embryos as
they feel best."59  Thus, if reproductive material is viewed as
"property," the "owner" may have extensive authority to control its
disposition, to the exclusion of third parties.' Conversely, if embryos
are characterized as "persons," 61 or if gametes are viewed as part of
the "person" of the individual from whom they derive, greater re-
strictions may be imposed as to their disposition.62
Whether a property right exists in the body and its parts is a
question that receives different responses, depending upon the con-
text in which it arises. For example, although abhorrence at the
enforced appropriation of the body in slavery compels negation of
the notion of a property right in another's body, concern for individ-
ual dignity and self-determination may lead to a willingness to
recognize a property interest in one's own body.63 Furthermore,
while laws relating to assault and battery protect an individual's dig-
58. See 63A AM. JUR. 2D Property § 1 (1984) (explaining that "'property' signifies
that dominion or indefinite right of use, control, and disposition which one may lawfully
exercise over particular things or objects; thus 'property' is nothing more than a collection
of rights").
59. John A. Robertson, Decisional Authority Over Embryos and Control of IVF
Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 285,299 (1988).
60. See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76
VA. L. REV. 437,455-56 (1990).
61. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
62. Of course, individuals may have broad decision-making authority with respect to
a person, although their rights in this context will not be nearly as extensive as for prop-
erty. For example, parents have decision-making authority regarding many areas of their
child's upbringing including education, medical care, religious teachings, and discipline.
This is the case even though they do not "own" their children. See Robertson, supra note
60, at 455 n.48. Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that in the nineteenth century,
children were often treated as "property," in the sense that their capacity for labor was
exploited for economic gain. See Viviana A. Zelizer, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD:
THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 169-207 (1985).
63. As the California Court of Appeal has noted, slavery presents an entirely differ-
ent context for applying property concepts than does biomedicine:
The evolution of civilization from slavery to freedom, from regarding people as
chattels to recognition of the individual dignity of each person, necessitates pru-
dence in attributing the qualities of property to human tissue. There is,
however, a dramatic difference between having property rights in one's own
body and being the property of another.
Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 504 (Ct. App. 1988), affd in part,
rev'd in-part, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); accord SCOTT, supra note 26, at 26 ("Slavery is
inspired by man's greed and cruelty, while transplantation and other therapies that em-
ploy human tissues are designed for man's benefit.").
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nitary interest, they may also be seen as protecting a property right.'
Case law relating to the nature of a person's interest in his or her
body reveals no consistent underlying philosophy or approach.' The
decision to label an interest as "property" represents a conclusion,
based upon public policy considerations, that the relevant interest is
entitled to certain legal protections.6 Given the range of positions
that exists regarding the moral significance of the body and its parts 7
and the fact that different ethical and societal questions are raised
depending upon which body part is in question, the nature and extent
of the interest an individual has in his or her body and its parts are far
from clear.' The fact that a person, while alive, can make a post-
mortem anatomical gift may be interpreted as some evidence that an
individual has a recognized ownership interest in his or her body.9
However, views differ on whether the traditional rights associated
with ownership, such as the right to dispose of one's property by sale,
ought to apply to any or all human body parts, or whether a
"property" classification is inappropriate. 70 For example, in most
states individuals either may sell or donate their blood, sperm, ova,
cells, and hair,7' but are prohibited from selling nonregenerative or-
64. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 966
(1982). Radin, in her explication of a personalty theory of property, notes:
If it makes sense to say that one owns one's body, then, on the embodiment the-
ory of personhood, the body is quintessentially personal property because it is
literally constitutive of one's personhood. If the body is property, then objec-
tively it is property for personhood. This line of thinking leads to a property
theory for the tort of assault and battery: Interference with my body is interfer-
ence with my personal property.
Id.
65. See Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property
Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEx. L. REv. 209,220 (1990).
66. See Steinbock, supra note 5, at 57-58 ("[I]t is only after we determine the moral
question of what may permissibly be done with something that we can determine if it is
properly treated as property. The normative question logically precedes the conceptual
legal analysis.").
67. See supra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
68. See Thomas H. Murray, Who Owns the Body? On the Ethics of Using Human
Tissue for Commercial Purposes, IRB, Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 1 (noting that "[t]here are three
general models of our relationship with parts of our body that become separated from it:
commercial property; surplus; or gifts").
69. See In re Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 n.4 (Utah 1978) (stating that the Utah Ana-
tomical Gift Act constitutes evidence that the state "legislature has recognized that a
person has property rights in his body and can so dispose of his organs").
70. See Gloria J. Banks, Legal and Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's Most
Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L.
& MED. 45,65-66 (1995).
71. See id. at 73.
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gans and tissue.'
The recognition that "surplus" organs, tissues, blood or cells may
have commercial value has focused attention in recent years on the
nature of a person's interest in these materials once they have been
removed from that individual's body. In Moore v. Regents of the
University of California," the plaintiff brought actions based on con-
version and lack of informed consent after doctors obtained blood
samples from him and took cells from his removed spleen without
informing him that their purpose in so doing was to develop a cell-
line.74 After the plaintiff became aware that the defendants had de-
veloped and patented the cell-line and that they had entered into a
number of highly lucrative contracts with biotechnology companies
for rights to the cell-line and its profits, he sued for his share of the
profits.' The California Supreme Court allowed the claim based on
lack of informed consent.76 However, it denied the conversion claim
for a share of the profits on the ground that the plaintiff had no prop-
erty right in his removed cells.'
With respect to sperm, eggs, and embryos, little judicial guidance
exists regarding the characterization of these materials. The Califor-
nia Court of Appeal's conclusion in Hecht V. Superior Court that
sperm is a "unique type of 'property' " due to its potential to create
a child, was based heavily on the reasoning of the Tennessee Su-
72. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr § 10 (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 58 (1993).
At the federal level, the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98
Stat. 2339 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74 (1988)), makes it a federal crime
"for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate
commerce." Id. § 301(a). Several state statutes supplement this Act by prohibiting the
sale of human organs and nonregenerative human tissues. See Banks, supra note 70, at 73
n.220 (listing state statutes).
73. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
74. See id. at 480-82.
75. See id. at 482.
76. See id. at 496-97.
77. See id. at 488-93.
78. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993).
79. See id. at 283. In the 1996 involving an appeal from an order by a probate judge,
the court of appeal again emphasized the distinction between genetic material and other
forms of property. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1289, 1295 (Ct. App.
1996). The court held that where there is clear evidence of the decedent's intent to be-
queath his sperm in order to reproduce posthumously with a chosen donee, the decedent's
right to procreate cannot be defeated by a contract between the donee and third parties.
See id. at 1296. The court stated that "to the extent this sperm is 'property' it is only
'property' for that one person. As such it is not an 'asset' of the estate subject to alloca-
tion ... to any other person whether through agreement or otherwise." Id.
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preme Court in Davis v. Davis.?° In Davis, the issue involved the
status of frozen embryos in a divorce proceeding. The Tennessee
court was faced with the question of who had dispositional authority,
in the absence of any prior agreement by the couple, over seven
cryopreserved embryos which had been created from Mr. and Mrs.
Davis's gametes during their marriage-Mr. Davis, who wanted the
embryos destroyed, or Mrs. Davis, who wished to donate the em-
bryos to another woman for implantation.8 Rejecting both the trial
court's holding that embryos are "persons," 2 and the Court of Ap-
peals's implicit adoption of a "property" model, the Tennessee
Supreme Court, holding for Mr. Davis, concluded that embryos 4 "are
not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an
interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their
potential for human life.""
As noted by the court, three major ethical positions emerge in
debates concerning the status of the embryo.8 At one end of the con-
tinuum is a position which views the embryo as a person from the
moment of conception, and accords the embryo all concomitant
rights. According to this stance, the zygote" "demands the uncondi-
tional respect that is morally due to the human being in his bodily
80. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
81. See id. at 589-90. Initially, Mrs. Davis wished to attempt to become pregnant with
the embryos. See Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.
13, 1990). However, by the time of the appellate decision, both the Davises had remar-
ried, see id2, and Mrs. Davis, now Mrs. Stowe, wished to donate the embryos to an infertile
couple. See id. at *1 n.1.
82. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, **9-11 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
1989) (holding that human life begins at conception, that the doctrine of parens patriae
controls "children" in vitro, and that consequently, custody of the embryos should be
awarded to Mrs. Davis who could bring them to term). For critical comment on the trial
court's opinion, see George 3. Annas, A French Homunculus in a Tennessee Court,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 20.
83. See Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *3 (noting that "[]ointly, the parties share an in-
terest" in the embryos, the court of appeals held that the Davises should have "joint
control of the fertilized ova... with equal voice over their disposition").
84. The Tennessee Supreme Court used the term "preembryo," rather than
"embryo," to denote the zygote at the stage immediately after division and up until 14
days after fertilization. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593-94. This Article, however, follows
common usage in referring to the early developing entity as an "embryo."
85. Id. at 597.
86. See id. at 596 (citing Report of the Ethics Committee of The American Fertility
Society, 53 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 1S, 34S-36S (1990)).
87. See id. (citing Report of the Ethics Committee of The American Fertility Society, 53
FERTILITY AND STERILITY 1S, 34S-36S (1990)).
88. "Zygote" is defined as "the diploid cell resulting from union of a sperm and an
ovum." ILLUSTRATED STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICIONARY 1590 (24th ed. 1982).
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and spiritual totality." 9 Adoption of this view would compel implan-
tation of the embryo and prohibit any action which might cause harm
to it. Since many embryos may not survive the freeze-thaw process,
cryopreservation might be considered harmful0 and, therefore, could
be prohibited. While fierce controversy continues over the moral
status of the embryo,9 the "embryo as person" view is not a position
that is reflected either in American common law or current constitu-
tional law. In the landmark abortion case of Roe v. Wade,2 the
United States Supreme Court held that "the word 'person,' as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."' While a
minority of states have enacted statutes that appear to prohibit the
discarding of frozen embryos,' homicide laws and wrongful death
statutes do not apply to harm caused to an embryo because an em-
bryo is not considered a "person."95
At the other end of the continuum is the view that the embryo is
"property" in the same way that household goods, for example, are
property. According to this position, embryos are "mere tissue," and
their owners have the sole right to determine their disposition. The
problem with this point of view, however, is that it fails to acknowl-
edge that the embryo should be accorded greater respect than other
tissue due to its potential for human life.96 As the New York Su-
preme Court noted in Kass v. Kass," a case which, like Davis,
involved a dispute between a divorced couple as to possession of
their frozen embryos:
89. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human
Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the
Day 13-14 (Vatican City 1987) (on file with author).
90. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596; Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo,
32 LOY. L. REV. 357,399 (1986).
91. The scholarly literature on this subject is vast. See, e.g., BONNIE STEINBOCK,
LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF EMBRYOS AND FETUSES
(1992) (collecting sources and reviewing a range of conceptual views regarding the moral
significance of embryos and fetuses).
92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing trimester framework for state regulation of
abortion).
93. Id at 158.
94. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-133 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.266(a) (West 1995); Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1)-(2) (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-9A-3 (Michie 1994).
95. For analysis of the legal status of the embryo, see Robertson, supra note 60; and
Andrews, supra note 90.
96. See Robertson, supra note 60, at 448 n.35 ("[Wie might wonder about a person
who thought that the early embryo deserved no respect at all, and could be treated like
dandruff, urine, or excrement.").
97. No. 19658/93, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan 18, 1995).
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The fact that zygotes are not persons from a legal stand-
point does not establish they are property within the
ordinary sense of that term. They most assuredly are not.
As life inchoate they represent the ultimate in nascency and
potentiality. Equating zygotes with washing machines and
jewelry for purposes of a marital distribution borders on the
absurd. The issues involved transcend such a context. To
paraphrase Shakespeare, they are the "stuff" of procrea-
tion. "
The failure to distinguish between embryos and other "property" by
allowing the "owners" of the embryo unlimited discretion in their
treatment of the embryo risks the devaluation of human life."
The intermediate position, and the one adopted by the court in
Davis, recognizes that the embryo is more than human tissue but at
the same time is not a person. Thus, while the embryo is not ac-
corded the status of a person, it deserves "special respect""' due to its
potential to become a person and its powerful symbolic meaning. t '
Consequently, those who have created embryos "have an interest in
the nature of ownership, to the extent that they have decision-making
authority concerning disposition of the preembryos, within the scope
of policy set by law.""' This view of reproductive material as com-
prising "quasi property,"'0' or property in which the donors retain an
ownership interest with extensive dispositional authority, is one that
has been adopted by existing case law," by the American Fertility
98. hd at *2; see also Hecht v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1289, 1298 (Ct. App.
1996) ("A man's sperm or a woman's ova or a couple's embryos are not the same as a
quarter of land, a cache of cash, or a favorite limousine. Rules appropriate to the disposi-
tion of the latter are not necessarily appropriate for the former.").
99. Cf. Rameden, supra note 5, at 397 (arguing that "[i]t is equally, if not more, per-
suasive ... to appeal to the property theories espoused by Locke and Hegel that accord a
very high respect for private property precisely because of one's labor and free will being
intermingled with something").
100. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,597 (Tenn. 1992).
101. See id at 596; see also Andrews, supra note 90, at 362-63 (describing the view held
by some that the embryo "is symbolic of human life or represents life in a way which
makes its destruction symbolic of the destruction of persons"). The notion that an em-
bryo is "potential human life" that the state has an interest in protecting, is integral to
current constitutional doctrine on abortion. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 871 (1992); Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 519 (1989); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973).
102 Davis, 842 S.W2d at 597.
103. Although the term "quasi property" is used here to include both gametes and
embryos, it may be argued that the term "quasi person" is more accurate with regard to
embryos, whose more developed potential for human life situates them closer to the
"person" end of the "personlproperty" continuum than gametes.
104. See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. In York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va.
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Society,"° and by current practice."6 In addition, the "quasi property"
view is consistent with the recognition that choices relating to pro-
creation and child rearing are "central to personal dignity and
autonomy.""'
The Hecht court, in its reliance upon the reasoning in Davis, im-
plicitly assumed that the legal framework set forth in Davis regarding
embryos should apply similarly to sperm. However, the moral status
of embryos and the moral status of gametes seem clearly distinguish-
able. While the question of whether an embryo meets the criteria of
"personhood" has aroused considerable controversy,' only the most
extreme view would characterize sperm or unfertilized eggs as
"persons."' 9 In fact, in the case of gametes, the relevant distinction is
1989), a district court seemed to adopt implicitly a view of frozen embryos as property. A
married couple who had undergone IVF at a fertility clinic in Virginia brought suit against
the clinic for refusing to release their frozen embryo, which the couple wished to have
transferred to a fertility clinic in California. See id. at 422-24. The district court held that
a bailment relationship existed between the parties, and that the plaintiffs had an action
in detinue based on the defendant's refusal to return the property upon demand. See id. at
427. In Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital, No. 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978)
(LEXIS, NY Library, NYMEGA File), a couple sued for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and conversion when their extracorporeal embryo was intentionally
destroyed by a doctor. The jury found for the couple on the emotional distress claim, but
held for the defendants on the conversion claim. See idt The district court's statement
that "the jury could reasonably have ... rendered a verdict for the defendants on the ba-
sis that the amount of damages for conversion was too speculative to be determinable"
could be interpreted as supporting a view of the frozen embryo as property. See id.
However, the jury's decision could also be understood as an unwillingness to treat human
life as property.
105. See Report of the Ethics Committee of The American Fertility Society, 53 FER-
TILITY AND STERILITY 1S, 34S-36S (1990); see also Report of the Ethics Committee of The
American Fertility Society, 46 FERTILITY AND STERILITY iS app. E at 89S (1986) ("It is
understood that the gametes and concepti are the property of the donors. The donors
therefore have the right to decide at their sole discretion the disposition of these items,
provided such disposition is within medical and ethical guidelines .... ").
106. Current sperm bank practice allows an individual who deposits sperm for his own
future use (a "client depositor") to have primary decision-making authority as to the dis-
position of his sperm. See Gilbert, supra note 5, at 548. Individuals who deposit sperm
for donation are required to sign a form waiving their rights to the sperm. See id. at 548
n.139. This requirement may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the donor's owner-
ship interest in his sperm. See id. at 548.
107. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,851 (1992).
108. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
109. As Peter Singer and Deane Wells state:
We do not know of anyone who seriously asserts that the moral status of the egg
and sperm before fertilization is such that it is wrong to destroy them.... [A]fter
all, in our normal lives eggs and sperm are constantly being wasted. Every nor-
mal female between puberty and menopause wastes an egg each month that she
does not become pregnant; and after puberty every normal male wastes millions
of sperm in sexual intercourse in which contraceptives are used or in which the
woman is not fertile ....
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not between "persons" and "property," but rather between "ordinary
property" and "unique property. ' .. While gametes are properly
characterized as "property" rather than "persons," they are never-
theless distinguishable from "ordinary property" because of the close
relationship they bear to the personhood of the donor. Due to their
life-creating potential and the fact that they carry nonreplicable char-
acteristics, gametes are intrinsically and vitally connected to the
personhood of the individual from whom they originate. Understood
in this way, the Davis court's reasoning, although referring only to
embryos, applies equally to gametes. Although sperm and eggs are
not as powerfully symbolic of human life as is the embryo, they too
"are the 'stuff of procreation" '' and, as such, can be viewed as be-
longing to an interim category of "quasi property," which is sui
generis, comprising neither "persons" nor "ordinary property."
The rejection of the "person" or "property" characterizations
and the carving out of an interim category has much appeal, in that it
reflects a sense that the "person/property" dichotomy is too stark to
adequately capture the essence of a person's interest in his or her
bodily parts. Professor Wex Malone, in discussing relational interests
in tort law, points out that the traditional classification of rights as
belonging to the categories of either "person" or "property" impedes
analysis of policy questions in a great many areas."' Malone observes
that because the common law recognized only these two categories,
many interests have been "awkwardly translated into incidents of
PETER SINGER & DEANE WELLS, MAKING BABIES: THE NEW SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF
CONCEPTION 71 (1985).
110. See Radin, supra note 64, at 959-60 (distinguishing "fungible property" from
"personal property"). Professor Radin states that personal property comprises property
which is so closely connected to us as individuals that it is "part of the way we constitute
ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world," such as a wedding ring, a portrait,
an heirloom, or a house. Id at 959. She argues that objects or resources can be so closely
bound up with personhood that "the person should be accorded broad liberty with respect
to control over that 'thing.'" lId at 960. Fungible property, on the other hand, comprises
property that is interchangeable with money, such as "the wedding ring in the hands of
the jeweler, the automobile in the hands of the dealer, the land in the hands of the devel-
oper, or the apartment in the hands of the commercial landlord." Id. Radin views the
relationship between persons and things as a continuum from fungible to personal, see id.
at 987, with a hierarchy of entitlements: "[t]he more closely connected with personhood,
the stronger the entitlement." Id at 986. Radin notes that some bodily parts, such as
blood, may become fungible commodities, but that some "bodily parts may be too
'personal' to be property at all." Id at 966. She concludes that it may be "appropriate to
call parts of the body property only after they have been removed from the system." Id.
111. See Kass v. Kass, No. 19658/93, 1995 WL 110368, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18,
1995).
112. See WEX S. MALONE, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL: INJURIES TO FAMILY, SOCIAL
AND TRADE RELATIONS 4-6 (1979).
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ownership"-for example, a person's name, reputation, goodwill, lit-
erary property, and trademarks." In arguing for a third category of
rights, namely rights in human relationships, Malone states:
The artificiality of this archaic twofold classification is pat-
ent, and a scheme of law whose protective scope was limited
to so narrow a range of human needs must prove eventually
to fall woefully short of the mark. In truth, the most impor-
tant and vital claims to legal protection are far more
complex than demands arising from harms to one's body or
belongings. They are claims that originate in our social en-
vironment...."'
Malone's point seems particularly apposite in considering the
relationship of a person to his or her reproductive material. It is in-
tuitively more satisfying to regard the interest of a progenitor in his
or her gametes and embryos as relational, rather than as an interest
in ownership or in personalty. But the difficult question raised by
Malone remains: If the interest is not viewed as being governed by
traditional laws applying to property or to persons, what legal princi-
ples should apply? This Article contends that the precise delineation
of rights and interests falling within this interim category, as it per-
tains to posthumous reproduction, should be shaped by specific
ethical and social policy considerations discussed below."1
II. THE LAW RELATING TO DEAD BODIES AND ORGAN DONATION
If reproductive material is viewed as a unique type of
"property," whose property is it? Specifically, when an individual
dies without explicitly authorizing posthumous procreation, or with
an express wish that posthumous procreation not take place, can his
or her reproductive material nevertheless be utilized after death for
procreative purposes? Analysis of this question involves weighing
the competing interests at stake: the interest of the surviving party in
pursuing his or her procreative plans, 6 and the interest of the de-
113. See id. at 5.
114. Id. at 3.
115. See infra notes 200-329 and accompanying text.
116. While this person is most likely to be the deceased's spouse or intimate partner,
there are other parties who may claim an interest in the deceased's gametes. For exam-
ple, when a 15 year-old boy was shot and killed in Los Angeles, his family requested the
extraction of his sperm because "[he] had been their only son, and they had wanted the
possibility of ensuring the family's male line." Davis, supra note 18, at 5-5. Furthermore,
a family member who is infertile may wish to utilize the deceased's gametes, rather than
using donor sperm or donor eggs or pursuing adoption. Even persons who never had an
association with the deceased may attempt to establish a claim: "[I]f Elvis Presley had
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ceased in controlling his or her procreative lineage.
Since no laws currently exist specifying who has the authority to
make decisions regarding posthumous procreation, a useful starting
point is to consider the law's approach in other relevant contexts in-
volving dead bodies, namely, the disposition of corpses and the
donation of cadaveric organs. As reproductive material constitutes a
special type of "property," posthumous procreation raises important
issues not present in these other two contexts. Nevertheless, all three
circumstances involve potential conflicts between the individual now
deceased and surviving family members in matters concerning the
deceased's bodily integrity. Thus, the approach of the law in allocat-
ing decision-making authority between individuals, their families, and
the state, both in organ donation and in the disposition of corpses, is
relevant in considering how the competing interests should be
weighed in posthumous reproduction.
A. Decision-Making Authority with Respect to Corpses
Under early English law, the ecclesiastical courts had sole juris-
diction over the mode and place of burial of dead bodies."7 The
church's claim to exclusive control in these matters was based on its
recognized authority in matters of life and death, related to the no-
tion that "[t]he spirit departed to the realms of the supernatural; the
body was held by the divine agent to await resurrection..1 . Ecclesias-
tical control may also have stemmed from the church's ownership of
burial grounds and the fact that it exercised probate jurisdiction."'
Ecclesiastical control in this area was so extensive that the common-
law courts were powerless,O and it was frequently asserted that "a
dead body by law belongs to no one."' 2' Authority for the proposi-
tion that there can be no property right in a dead body was based in
part on dictum by Sir Edward Coke, who stated that "[t]he buriall of
the cadaver, (that is, caro data vermibus [flesh given to worms]), is
nullius in bonis, and belongs to ecclesiastical cognizance."'  Coke's
statement has been criticized as being without historical and legal
deposited sperm prior to his death, thousands of his fans would have tried to claim the
rights to his sperm to bear Elvis' child." Gilbert, supra note 5, at 554.
117. See Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1182, 1241 (1974).
118. PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF BURIAL AND BURIAL
PLACES 126 (1950).
119. See Walter F. Kuzenski, Property in Dead Bodies, 9 MARQ. L. REV. 17, 18 (1924).
120. See JACKSON, supra note 118, at 126-27.
121. Id. at 127 (citing Foster v. Dodd, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 67 (1867)).
122. EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND *203, cited in JACKSON, supra note 118, at 127.
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foundation,"2' as has its interpretation that there is no property inter-
est in a dead body.' It has also been suggested that the asserted lack
of property rights in a corpse appears to be inconsistent with the
practice, which continued in England until 1804, whereby creditors
could arrest a corpse for a debt owed by the deceased.' Neverthe-
less, the proposition that no one has property rights in a corpse was
consistently reiterated in the case law."
The absence of a legally recognized property interest in a corpse
and the total authority of ecclesiastical courts in matters pertaining to
the dead had far-reaching implications. First, it meant that English
courts could refuse to give effect to an individual's wishes regarding
the disposition of his or her body after death.'27 Moreover, although
the rule that no property rights existed in a dead body was based on
reverence for the dead and sympathy for the relatives," it ironically
deprived the deceased's relatives of a private cause of action against
unlawful interference with the body of the deceased.' 29 While rela-
tives had both the right and the duty to bury their kin, the absence of
a property right in a corpse presented a legal obstacle in the efforts of
family members to recover possession of the corpse from an inter-
loper."O Interlopers were not uncommon, since the "no property"
123. See, e.g., Paul Matthews, Whose Body? People as Property, 36 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 193,198 (1983).
124. See Law of Burial, 4 Brad. Surr. app. 503, 521 (note taken from the report of
Samuel B. Ruggles, Referee, in the matter of the widening of Beekman Street in the New
York Supreme Court in 1856) ("But even the dictum itself, if closely examined, will not
be found to assert, that no individual can have any legal interest in a corpse. It does not
at all assert that the corpse, but only that the 'buriall,' is 'nullius in bonis'....").
125. See Kuzenski, supra note 119, at 18; cf Note, supra note 117, at 1243-44 (citing
the proposition that there was no support in Roman law for the arrest of corpses, and that
the practice may have arisen from a misinterpretation of the technical language of the
writ, which directed the sheriff to have the "body of the debtor" at Westminster on the
day payment was due, without specifying whether the body be alive or dead).
126. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 20 Ch. D. 659, 662-63 (1882) ("It is quite clearly
the law of this country that there can be no property in the dead body of a human be-
ing."). In Williams, the court noted that "[i]t follows that a man cannot by will dispose of
his dead body. If there be no property in a dead body it is impossible that by will or any
other instrument the body can be disposed of." Id. at 665.
127. See Jesse Dukeminier, Jr. & David Sanders, Organ Transplantation: A Proposal
for Routine Salvaging of Cadaver Organs, 279 NEW ENG. J. MED. 413,414 (1968).
128. See Michael H. Scarmon, Note, Brotherton v. Cleveland: Property Rights in the
Human Body-Are the Goods Oft Interred With Their Bones?, 37 S.D. L. REV. 429, 437
(1992).
129. See Kuzenski, supra note 119, at 18; 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*429 (1766) ("[T]hough the heir has property in the monuments and escutcheons of his
ancestors, yet he has none in their bodies or ashes.").
130. Kuzenski, supra note 119, at 18-19.
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rule contributed to a thriving trade of "body snatching" where
"resurrectionists" would unearth newly buried corpses, remove them
from their burial ground, and sell them to anatomy schools."' Al-
though by the late eighteenth century courts did impose criminal
sanctions for the unlawful disinterment of dead bodies,' relatives
could neither maintain a private action in trespass for any unauthor-
ized mutilation or dissection of the corpse, nor claim a right of
replevin for a body unlawfully taken or withheld.'
Ecclesiastical law controlled burials and cemeteries in England
until the adoption of the English Burial Acts of 1855.? In America,
the system of ecclesiastical law was unknown.' Today, both Ameri-
can and English courts of equity adjudicate claims to corpses,13
exercising "'a benevolent discretion.' ,,7 Although American courts
followed the English "no property" rule,S the recognition that rela-
tives have an interest in burying their dead without unlawful
interference led courts in America to create a special category of
"quasi property rights" in dead bodies:
Although ... the body is not property in the usually recog-
nized sense of the word, yet we may consider it as a sort of
quasi property, to which certain persons may have rights, as
they have duties to perform towards it arising out of our
common humanity. But the person having charge of it can-
not be considered as the owner of it in any sense whatever;
he holds it only as a sacred trust for the benefit of all who
may from family or friendship have an interest in it.1
39
The right is "quasi" in the sense that the corpse could not be
sold, but operates as a qualified form of "property" in that
131. See SCOTr, supra note 26, at 5. The trade in dead bodies, which continued until
the Anatomy Act of 1832 imposed licensing and strict reporting requirements upon anat-
omy schools, culminated in some infamous trials of "body snatchers" who committed
murder in order to sell the corpses. See id. at 9-12. See generally RUTH RICHARDSON,
DEATH, DISSECTION AND THE DESTITUTE 52-72 (1987) (providing an historical ac-
counting of corpses being treated as commodities).
132. See The King v. Lynn, 100 Eng. Rep. 394, 394-95 (K.B. 1788); SCOTT, supra note
26, at 7 (noting that these criminal offenses "initially applied more to the body snatchers
than to their customers, with the absurd result that once a corpse left a body snatcher's
hands its return could not be ensured").
133. See Note, supra note 117, at 1242-43.
134. See JACKSON, supra note 118, at 22.
135. See id. at 27.
136. See Dukeminier & Sanders, supra note 127, at 414.
137. See id. (citing Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 128 (N.Y. 1926)).
138. See, e.g., Enos v. Snyder, 63 P. 170 (Cal. 1900).
139. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 242-43 (1872).
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"possession for a certain human and familial purpose [is] assigned
and legally protected."" It is likely that this "quasi property" inter-
est, however, has little to do with the concept of "ownership" of a
dead body. Rather, it constitutes a recognition that indignities to a
dead body may violate the mental and emotional well-being of the
deceased's kin, and that the interest in psychological and emotional
integrity is worthy of legal protection."' As Prosser states, "[i]t seems
reasonably obvious that such 'property' is something evolved out of
thin air to meet the occasion, and that in reality the personal feelings
of the survivors are being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive
no one but a lawyer."'4 2 By invoking the notion of a "quasi property"
interest, courts granted the family a right to sue for any unauthorized
mutilation of the corpse rendering the body unfit for proper burial-
including any unauthorized autopsy'9-and a right to control the dis-
position of the deceased's remains when the deceased did not issue
any directives.' " In cases where the deceased's wishes concerning the
mode or place of burial are known, courts usually have attempted to
take these into account,' 5 while also considering the sensibilities of
the deceased's living family members and the interests of the public.
As Justice Cardozo stated:
The wishes of wife and next of kin are not always supreme
and final though the body is yet unburied. Still less are they
supreme and final when the body has been laid at rest and
140. RAMSEY, supra note 33, at 204.
141. Cf. DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 59 (2d ed. 1993). Families have
sometimes asserted that their "quasi property" interest in the remains of the deceased
amounts to a property right for the purposes of bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994). See Scarmon, supra note 128, at 438-40. However, courts have generally held that
unauthorized interference by the state with a corpse does not take on constitutional di-
mensions, and that the relatives do not have a claim based on the deprivation of a
property right without due process. See id.
142. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 63
(5th ed. 1984).
143. See Carl E. Wasmuth & Bruce H. Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Human
Organ Transplantation, 14 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REv. 442, 463 (1965) (stating that when
an unauthorized autopsy occurred, the next of kin could bring a common-law action for
interference with their personal right to give the body a proper burial, and could recover
damages for mental distress). Under statutory law, a coroner may examine and dissect a
body if justified by the circumstances, regardless of the wishes of the deceased or next of
kin. See Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed
Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. REV. 681,691 (1988).
144. See JACKSON, supra note 118, at 48-61.
145. See Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 128 (N.Y. 1926) (stating that "[t]he wish of
the deceased, even though legal compulsion may not attach to it, has at least a large sig-




the aid of equity is invoked to disturb the quiet of the grave.
There will then be due regard to the interests of the public,
the wishes of the decedent, and the rights and feelings of
those entitled to be heard by reason of relationship or asso-
ciation.1"
Although the autonomy interest of the deceased in directing the
manner of disposition of his or her body is accorded considerable
weight,1 47 it is not necessarily dispositive.' While some courts have
held that directions in a will regarding the deceased's remains are
"usually paramount to all other considerations, including the objec-
tions of the next of kin,"" 9 courts have sometimes allowed the
family's wishes to override the express wishes of the deceasedYm In
general, courts will give substantial weight to the deceased's ex-
pressed desires, whether oral or written, and will take into account all
surrounding circumstances in deciding whether those desires should
prevail if they conflict with the wishes of surviving family members.'
Thus, the law relating to the disposition of dead bodies reveals
that while the individual's wishes were not regarded as conclusive,
the family's decision-making role was a limited one, intended to pro-
tect the family's sensibilities and ensure a proper burial for the
deceased. However, in the context of organ donation, current law
146. Id (internal quotation omitted).
147. See In re Moyer, 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978). In Moyer, the court describes an indi-
vidual's interest in directing the disposition of his or her body after death as a "property
right of a special nature" enabling the individual to make a disposition "which should be
recognized and held to be binding after his [or her] death, so long as that is done within
the limits of reason and decency as related to the accepted customs of mankind." Ld. at
110.
148. See Chad D. Naylor, The Role of the Family in Cadaveric Organ Procurement, 65
IND. L.J. 167, 172 (1989).
149. Stewart v. Schwartz Brothers-Jeffer Memorial Chapel, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 965, 968
(Sup. Ct. 1993) (dictum); see also In re Estate of Eichner, 18 N.Y.S.2d 573, 573 (Sur. Ct.
1940) (stating that "the wishes of a decedent in respect of the disposition of his remains
are paramount to all other considerations").
150. For example, in Holland v. Metalious, 198 A.2d 654 (N.H. 1964), the deceased's
will directed that no funeral services be held and that her body be donated to a university
for experimentation. See id, at 655. After the university refused to accept the body, a
dispute arose between the family, who wanted a funeral, and the executor who sought an
injunction to prevent funeral services. See id. The lower court denied the injunction, and
its decision was affirmed on appeal. See id. at 656. While the state supreme court at-
tempted to harmonize its decision with the directive in the will by stating that the
deceased's wish that funeral services not be held was contingent upon the donation of her
body to the university, see id., the case can equally be interpreted as granting priority to
the wishes of the family over those of the deceased.
151. See, e.g., Rosenblum v. New Mt. Sinai Cemetery Assoc., 481 S.W.2d 593,595 (Mo.
1972).
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has expanded considerably the decision-making authority vested in
the deceased's family.
B. Decision-Making Authority with Respect to Cadaveric Organs
The common-law principle that there is no property in a dead
body meant that a person had no legal power to authorize the dona-
tion of his or her organs or tissues after death.12 Moreover, when
cadaveric organ donation became a reality in the 1960s, the notion
that the deceased's next of kin were entitled to receive the body in
the same condition as when death occurred so that they could pro-
vide a proper burial' 3 resulted in a reluctance by physicians to
remove organs from the deceased without the family's consent.5" In
response to the resulting uncertainty, and the consequent shortage of
acquired organs, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws (NCCUSL) endorsed the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act (UAGA) in 1968.155 By 1973, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia had adopted a version of the UAGA.56 In 1987, in an ef-
fort to increase organ donations, the NCCUSL approved an amended
version of the UAGA.' Although the UAGA's definition of human
body "parts" that can be donated is broad enough to include sperm
and eggs, '58 the Act does not apply to posthumous procreation since
the stated purposes for donation are for "transplantation, therapy,
medical or dental education, research, or advancement of medical or
dental science."'59
The UAGA outlines the process for making and receiving dona-
tions,W prohibits the sale of organs, 16' and sets forth, inter alia, who
may authorize donations,'6 2 what bodily parts may be donated, ' and
who may be a donee.'" The Act highlights the autonomy interest of
152. See Dukeminier & Sanders, supra note 127, at 414.
153. See Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471,473-74 (App. Div. 1896).
154. See Naylor, supra note 148, at 173.
155. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFrAcr (1968) (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 94-132 (1993).
156. See Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1519, 1617 (1990).
157. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFrACr (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 29-62 (1993).
158. The Act defines "part" as "an organ, tissue, eye, bone, artery, blood, fluid, or
other portion of a human body." Id. § 1(7), 8A UL.A. 30.
159. Id § 6, 8A U.L.A. 53.
160. Id. §§ 2-7, 8A U.L.A. 33-55.
161. Id. § 10, 8A U.L.A. 58.
162. See id. §§ 2-3, 8A U.L.A. 33-43.
163. See id. § 1, 8A U.L.A. 29.
164. See id. § 6, 8A U.L.A. 53.
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the decedent by making it clear that the decedent's, expressed wishes
regarding organ donation prevail over the wishes of any other party.
An anatomical gift may not be made by a person who knows of a re-
fusal or a contrary indication by the decedent." Moreover, an
anatomical gift that has not been revoked by the donor before death
"is irrevocable and does not require the consent or concurrence of
any person after the donor's death."' Although in practice physi-
cians, hospitals and organ procurement agencies in the vast majority
of cases seek the consent of the deceased's family before accepting a
valid anatomical gift,67 the language of the UAGA is unequivocal in
vesting independent legal authority in the individual to determine the
disposition of his or her own body parts.
However, when the individual has not expressed his or her desire
for, or objection to, organ donation, the UAGA vests primary deci-
sion-making authority in the individual's family. The Act sets forth a
hierarchy of relationships, prioritized as follows: (1) the spouse of
the decedent; (2) an adult son or daughter of the decedent; (3) either
parent of the decedent; (4) an adult brother or sister of the decedent;
(5) a grandparent of the decedent; and (6) a guardian of the person of
the decedent at the time of death.68 A person designated in this list
may authorize a gift only if no person in a prior class is available at
the time of death to make a gift,'69 and if there is no known objection
to donation by a member of the person's class or of a prior class'70 or
165. See icL § 3(b)(2), 8A U.L.A. 41.
166. Id. § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. 34.
167. As one writer has noted, "the UAGA's assumption that the decedent's wishes
should prevail is inconsistent with cultural assumptions in the United States regarding the
wishes of the next-of-kin." Orly Hazony, Note, Increasing the Supply of Cadaver Organs
for Transplantation: Recognizing that the Real Problem is Psychological Not Legal, 3
HEALTH MATRIX 219, 230 (1993). Fear of litigation constitutes the primary reason why
the medical profession seeks the consent of the deceased's family instead of acting pursu-
ant to the would-be donor's wishes, even though the UAGA specifically grants an
individual the right to make an anatomical gift without veto by others (section 2(h)), and
provides a "good faith" defense (section 11(c)). See Daniel G. Jardine, Comment, Liabil-
ity Issues Arising Out of Hospitals' and Organ Procurement Organizations' Rejection of
Valid Anatomical Gifts: The Truth and Consequences, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1655, 1666.
Other reasons for seeking consent from the next of kin include concern for the emotional
well-being of the deceased's family at a time of shock and grief, and a fear that if organs
are taken in accordance with the deceased's instructions but contrary to the family's
wishes a backlash of public sentiment will ensue, resulting in a decrease in organ dona-
tion. See id. at 1666-67.
168. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr § 3(a) (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 40 (1993).
169. See id. § 3(b)(1), 8A U.L.A. 41.
170. See id. § 3(b)(3), 8A U.L.A. 41.
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by the decedent.171
The family's role also has been given prominence by the inclu-
sion of a "Routine Inquiry and Required Request" provision in the
1987 amendments to the UAGA."' This section states that a person
designated by the hospital must discuss with each patient over the age
of eighteen or, if that is not possible, with the patient's family, the
option of organ donation. Since, in many cases, the patient will not
be in a condition to participate in such a discussion, the required re-
quest provision has the effect of significantly "elevat[ing] the family's
role to that of primary agent of consent.''
A different model from that found in the UAGA relies upon
"presumed consent."'74 In this regime, a presumption exists that ca-
daveric organs may be removed unless the medical personnel are
notified of an objection by the deceased prior to the deceased's
death, or possibly by the deceased's next of kin."5 An important ra-
tionale for presumed consent is that shifting the onus from the
physician to the person who does not want the organs removed pro-
duces a greater supply of organs for transplantation.176 Moreover,
some argue that presumed consent is more humane than a system of
"encouraged voluntarism, '' "V in that it avoids burdening family mem-
bers by asking them to make a difficult decision at a time of intense
emotional stress."
Although the presumed consent model operates in over a dozen
countries,'79 it has not attracted a great deal of support in the United
States,"' where it exists only in a very limited form.' Some oppose
171. See id. § 3(b)(2), 8A U.L.A. 41.
172. Id. § 5, 8A U.L.A. 47.
173. Naylor, supra note 148, at 179.
174. See A.H. Barnett & David L. Kaserman, The Shortage of Organs for Transplan-
tation: Exploring the Alternatives, 9 ISSUES LAW & MED. 117, 121 (1993).
175. There are numerous forms that such "opting out" policies can take, and variations
exist regarding the stringency of the requirements for communicating an objection to
organ donation. See icL at 122. Moreover, models differ as to whether the objection must
be made by the individual, the individual's family, or both. See id.
176. See Dukeminier & Sanders, supra note 127, at 418.
177. See Silver, supra note 143, at 704.
178. Jesse Dukeminier, Supplying Organs for Transplantation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 811,
830-31 (1970); cf. Silver, supra note 143, at 705 (stating that a "presumed consent system
might amplify the anguish by requiring the potential donor or family to protest dona-
tion.., at a time when the hospital's good will is cherished").
179. See Fred H. Cate, Human Organ Transplantation: The Role of Law, 20 J. CORP.
L. 69, 83 n.113 (1994) (Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Greece,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland).
180. For a listing of proponents of some version of a presumed consent model, see
Erik S. Jaffe, "She's Got Bette Davis[s] Eyes:" Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of
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presumed consent on the grounds that it "depend[s] for its success on
the unhappy fact that most human beings are disinclined toward ac-
tive protest of that which is customary and routine" and thereby
"insidiously exploits the citizen's regrettable reluctance to dissent."' 2
Paul Ramsey raises an additional concern, namely, the impact that a
policy of presumed consent has on the moral values of the individual.
Ramsey states that presumed consent "would deprive individuals of
the exercise of the virtue of generosity" whereas affirmative consent
encourages "real givers" and "meets the measure of authentic com-
munity.' ' 8 Furthermore, presumed consent may deprive the
deceased's family of an opportunity to object to the removal of or-
gans, since in many cases the family will be unaware that organs are
being removed.' As one commentator has noted, "'presumed con-
sent' laws attempt to reduce both the individual's and the family's
roles in order to maximize the number of organs retrieved.""I
As the above discussion illustrates, the UAGA and presumed
consent models apportion controlling power differently among the
various parties involved in the donation of cadaverie organs. Rele-
vant distinctions between organ donation and posthumous
reproduction need to be examined in order to assess whether either
of these organ donation models should apply to procreation after
death.
Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 528,
528 n.2 (1990).
181. Some state statutes authorize a coroner, under certain conditions, to remove cor-
neas or pituitary glands without taking affirmative steps to discover the attitudes of the
deceased or the deceased's family towards donation, provided no objection by the de-
ceased or the family is known to the coroner. See icL at 536. Constitutional challenges
have been brought against some of these statutes. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923
F.2d 477, 479-82 (6th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the existence of a due process claim by a
widow for removal of her deceased husband's corneas without her consent); State v. Pow-
ell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1193 (Fla. 1986) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a statute
permitting removal of corneas without the consent of the family of the donor); Georgia
Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985) (same).
182. Silver, supra note 143, at 706 (arguing in favor of an organ draft, rather than a
system of presumed consent).
183. RAMSEY, supra note 33, at 210.
184. See id Some have suggested that when a family member has an objection to or-
gan donation on religious grounds and is not immediately available to communicate his or
her objection, "grave constitutional questions, such as the abridgement of religious free-
dom or the denial of due process, could invalidate the system." Alfred M. Sadler et al.,
Transplantation-A Case for Consent, 280 NEw ENG. J. MED. 862,866 (1969).
185. Naylor, supra note 148, at 180.
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C. Posthumous Procreation Distinguished
Gamete donation differs from organ donation in that it is life-
creating rather than life-sustaining or life-enhancing. As a result, dif-
ferent interests are at stake for the individual, the family and the
state, and the legal framework appropriate to resolving disputes in-
volving cadaveric organs is not necessarily transferable to disputes
concerning cadaveric gametes.
The current legal framework for organ donation is based on the
premise that organ transplantation is a socially desirable practice.
Modem medicine's ability to rescue a person by means of organ
transplantation from an otherwise certain death gives dramatic ex-
pression to society's interest in preserving life. The discrepancy
between the limited supply of organs and the relatively high demand
for them is a source of ongoing societal concern."' The state's inter-
est in maximizing the number of available organs is furthered by
adopting either a presumed consent model, or a model such as the
UAGA which, while acknowledging the family's historically promi-
nent decision-making role, attempts to encourage the family to make
a donation through the use of "required request" provisions. In con-
trast, a model of "presumed non-consent," which would prohibit the
removal of organs in the absence of prior authorization by the de-
ceased, would be inconsistent with the state's interest in increasing
the supply of organs."l
Organ donation presents a morally compelling case largely be-
cause organs are a relatively scarce resource, and because the
shortage of organs entails the hastening of death for existing indi-
viduals. In contrast, society's interest in acquiring gametes from dead
persons is weak. Gamete donation does not save the life of an exist-
186. This concern motivated the amendments to the UAGA in 1987. See UNIF.
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, Prefatory Note (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 20-23 (1993). It
has also inspired numerous proposals by scholars who believe that current law does not
provide adequate incentives for donating organs. For examples of such proposals, see
Barnett & Kaserman, supra note 174, at 119-27; Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman,
The Economics and Ethics of Alternative Cadaveric Organ Procurement Policies, 8 YALE
J. ON REG. 403, 420-39 (1991); Cate, supra note 179, at 83-87; Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing
the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 32-51 (1989/1990); Dukeminier & Sanders, supra note 127, at 418-19; Henry
Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & LAW 57 passim (1989); Hazony, supra note 167, at 242-51; and Silver,
supra note 143, at 694-728.
187. But see Paul M. Quay, Utilizing the Bodies of the Dead, 28 ST. Louis U. L.J. 889,
900 (1984) (arguing that UAGA should be amended so that no person other than the
decedent can donate any part of a dead body).
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ing person,"s but rather creates the potential for a new person."8 9 Fur-
thermore, unlike many life-saving organs which can only be obtained
from cadavers, gametes can be donated by living persons"' and are
not nearly as scarce as cadaveric organs.9
Moreover, the considerations that are relevant in evaluating the
interests of the deceased individual and the family members in post-
humous procreation differ from those in cadaveric organ donation.
On the one hand, it could be argued that the family should assume a
more central role in posthumous reproduction than in posthumous
organ donation, since the decision to create a child using the de-
ceased's gametes will have enduring emotional, psychological and
financial implications for the family in a way that the donation of or-
gans to anonymous individuals will not. On the other hand, precisely
because the implications of posthumous procreation are so serious
and permanent for the deceased's family, it is reasonable to claim
that the family's decision-making role should be more limited here
than in organ donation because the potential for a conflict of interest
is greater."
Additionally, after death the interests of the individual, who
while alive may not have wished to become a parent, must be taken
into account. Allowing a person to control the fate of his or her gam-
etes is arguably even more significant than allowing a person to
control the fate of his or her cadaveric organs, because procreation is
188. Circumstances may exist where gametes are donated in order to create a child
who may be able to save the life of an existing human being. For example, Mary and Abe
Ayala had a baby daughter, Marissa, with the hope that the baby's bone marrow could be
transplanted to save the life of the couple's older daughter, Anissa. See Lance Morrow,
When One Body Can Save Another: A Family's Act of Lifesaving Conception Was on the
Side of Angels, But Hovering In the Wings is the Devilish Ghost of Dr. Mengele, TIME,
June 17, 1991, at 54. There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that conceiving a child
to be a donor is not altogether rare. See Vicki G. Norton, Unnatural Selection: Nonthera-
peutic Preimplantation Genetic Screening and Proposed Regulation, 41 UCLA L. REv.
1581, 1602 (1994).
189. See Live Sperm, Dead Bodies, supra note 5, at 34 (arguing that "sperm harvesting
creates new needs rather than fulfills existing ones").
190. Rare circumstances are imaginable, however, when there could be a societal
preference for using cryopreserved gametes from dead people rather than from living
persons-for example, in the event of a nuclear disaster in which radiation contaminates
the gametes of the living.
191. Because a woman's eggs are not replenishable, they are a scarcer resource than
sperm. Moreover, unlike sperm, which is easily accessible, egg retrieval constitutes an
invasive medical process. See INFERTILrrY, supra note 2, at 123. However, the practice
of egg donation from live donors has grown considerably in recent years. See Andrea
Mechanick Braverman, Survey Results on the Current Practice of Ovum Donation, 59
FERTILITY & STERILITY 1216,1216 (1993).
192 See infra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
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central to an individual's identity in a way that organ donation is
not.193
The nature of a person's interest in avoiding reproduction after
death when he or she has not authorized posthumous procreation
must be explored in order to decide how much weight that interest
should be given, as compared with the interest of a surviving family
member in procreating with the deceased's reproductive material.
Resolution of the conflict between these two competing procreative
liberties cannot be resolved with reference to autonomy alone. De-
spite the centrality of autonomy as a guiding principle in bioethics,1"
an appeal to autonomy is of limited utility here. As Professor John
Robertson observes, "not every choice is protected, and autonomy
itself cannot explain which exercises of autonomy are of critical im-
portance."'' 5 Robertson aptly notes that "[w]hile a commitment to
autonomy might launch the inquiry, it cannot direct how to rank dif-
ferent uses or expressions of autonomy." '196 The conflict can be
resolved only by examining the interests at stake and by assessing the
significance of the deceased's pre-mortem wish not to procreate.
Where an individual, while alive, expresses a wish to procreate
posthumously, but, after his or her death the surviving partner is un-
willing to reproduce using the deceased's gametes," the conflict is
easily resolved: just as a living person cannot force an unwilling
partner to procreate, the deceased's prior wish to procreate cannot
trump the surviving partner's objection to becoming a biological par-
ent. The more contentious conflict arises when a surviving family
member"' wishes to procreate using the deceased's reproductive ma-
terial contrary to objections expressed by the individual now
deceased, or in the face of the unknown wishes of that individual.
193. See infra notes 248-56 and accompanying text.
194. See generally TOM L BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 120-81 (4th ed. 1994) (using the concept of autonomy to examine
health care decisions).
195. Robertson, supra note 1, at 1031.
196. ld. at 1034.
197. The situation involving embryos, as opposed to gametes, is more complex. See
infra notes 285-329 and accompanying text.
198. The traditional model of the family may be described as a married woman and
man raising their offspring. However, given the many divergences from this model that
exist today, many people function as "family members," even though those relationships
may not be recognized by the law. In this Article, the terms "family member" and "next
of kin" include cohabitating intimate partners. They do not, however, refer to would-be
egg or sperm donors who, prior to death, may have indicated a desire to donate their re-
productive material to a lesbian or gay couple. The issues involved in such a scenario lie
beyond the scope of this Article.
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While the law gives considerable protection to the right of living per-
sons to avoid procreation,1" it is not clear whether this protection
continues after death. A key question, then, is whether a person's
interest in avoiding procreation after death should be regarded as
significantly less important than this interest during life.
III. THE CONCEPT OF POSTHUMOUS HARM
When analyzing the interest in avoiding posthumous procreation
and weighing it against competing interests, the following question
must be addressed: Can we sensibly speak of the dead as having
"interests" which can be "harmed" by the conduct of surviving par-
ties? Part III argues that while it is true that death brings a person's
existence to an end, the dead nevertheless have interests which can
be either promoted or harmed by posthumous events.
Whether an individual after death retains interests that can be
harmed is an issue that has inspired considerable controversy among
philosophers. The concept of posthumous harm has been examined
with particular thoroughness by two philosophers, Joel Feinberg and
Ernest Partridge, in a debate that explores many of the complexities
involved in the concept of "harming the dead."' '
Feinberg maintains that, although after death a person ceases to
exist, that individual's interests can still be affected post-mortem.'
Thus, he claims, defaming the dead or breaking promises to the dead
are acts which harm the dead. Partridge argues that while such acts
may properly be said to be morally wrong, they do not harm the dead
because "[t]he dead ... have no interests and are beyond both harm
199. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
452-53 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484-86 (1965).
200. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, in 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 79-95 (1984) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS]; Joan C. Calla-
han, On Harming the Dead, 97 ETHICS 341 passim (1987); Joel Feinberg, Harm and Self-
Interest, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 285,
299-308 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977) [hereinafter Feinberg, Harm and Self-
Interest]; Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in PHILOSOPHY
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43, 57-60 (William T. Blackstone ed., 1974) [hereinafter
Feinberg, Rights]; Barbara Baum Levenbook, Harming Someone After His Death, 94
ETHICS 407 passim (1984); Ernest Partridge, Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Re-
spect, 91 ETHICS 243 passim (1981); George Pitcher, The Misfortunes of the Dead, 21 AM.
PHIL. Q. 183 passim (1984).
201. See Partridge, supra note 200. Partridge's article critiques Feinberg's thesis as set
forth in Feinberg, Rights, supra note 200, at 57-60; and Feinberg, Harm and Self-Interest,
supra note 200, at 299-308. In FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 200, at 79-95,
Feinberg further refines his thesis in response to Partridge's challenge.
202. See FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 200, at 79-95; Feinberg, Harm and
Self-Interest, supra note 200, at 299-308; Feinberg, Rights, supra note 200, at 57-60.
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or benefit."' 3
The basis of the debate between Feinberg and Partridge is
grounded in three fundamental arguments posited by Feinberg.2 1
First, Feinberg distinguishes "want-fulfillment" from "want-
satisfaction."2'' The "fulfillment of a want" is "simply the coming
into existence of that which is desired," whereas the "satisfaction of a
want" is "the pleasant experience of contentment or gratification that
normally occurs in the mind of the desirer when he believes that his
desire has been fulfilled."' 6 Feinberg argues that even though a dead
person cannot experience satisfaction or contentment in a subjective
sense (i.e., "want-satisfaction"), each individual has interests that
survive beyond his or her existence, and may be promoted or hin-
dered in an objective sense (i.e., "want-fulfillment").
Second, Feinberg contends that posthumous interests must be
understood relationally.2s Using defamation as an example, he as-
serts that the reason a dead person's interest in maintaining a good
reputation can be harmed by defamatory statements is because peo-
ples' interests extend to "events that occur outside of [their]
immediate experience and at some future time. 2 9 In other words,
what is harmed is the "person's desires to stand in certain relations to
other people.,
211
Finally, Feinberg argues that a person can be harmed even
though he or she is unaware of the harm.11 Once again invoking
defamation as an example, he claims that a living person's reputa-
tional interest is injured when libelous statements are made even if
the statements are made in a geographically remote place, and even
though the subject of the libel is totally unaware and will always re-
main unaware of the statements.212 He then extends this argument to
the dead, reasoning that if awareness of libel is not necessary for the
interests of live people to be harmed, neither is it necessary in the
case of the dead.Y While noting that the law of defamation in the
203. Partridge, supra note 200, at 244.
204. See id. at 243-64.
205. Feinberg, Harm and Self-Interest, supra note 200, at 302. Feinberg attributes this
distinction to W.D. Ross. See W. DAVID Ross, FOUNDATIONS OF ETHics 300 (1939).
206. Feinberg, Harm and Self-Interest, supra note 200, at 302.
207. See id. at 303.
208. See id. at 304-05.
209. Id. at 304.
210. Id. at 305.
211. See id. at 305-07.
212. See i. at 305-06.
213. See id. at 305-08.
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United States does not protect the dead unless a living person's in-
terests are adversely affected,214 Feinberg suggests that this rule only
makes sense on the assumption that reputation or other relevant in-
terests do not survive death.215 However, he claims, the "self-
centered interest" a person has "in the continued high regard of
[one's] fellows" is defeated if that person is defamed after death, and
thus the dead person's interest is harmed despite the deceased's pre-
sumed inability to feel distressed or humiliated.2 16
Throughout his discussion, Feinberg acknowledges the paradox
in ascribing rights to a "mere corpse" '217 and concedes that "[m]ere
inanimate things can have no interests, and what is incapable of hav-
ing interests is incapable of having rights.218 Nevertheless, he asserts
that "if the idea of an interest's surviving its possessor's death is a
kind of fiction, it is a fiction that most living men have a real interest
in preserving." 19 As a society, he argues, we recognize that what
happens to a person's body, property, and reputation after death is
important to that person while he or she is alive.m Consequently, we
have developed procedures designed to effectuate individuals' desires
to control certain matters after death, such as the transplantation of
their organs, the transfer of their property, and the nomination of
beneficiaries under life insurance policies. T' Feinberg concludes that
promises made while the promisee is alive impose on the promisor a
duty which does "not suddenly become null and void" after the death
of the promisee.'
Partridge challenges this thesis by claiming that the paradox in-
herent in Feinberg's view renders the argument "incoherent. '
Partridge maintains that while it is morally wrong to defame the dead
or to break promises to the dead, such acts cannot be characterized as
214. See Feinberg, Rights, supra note 200, at 59; accord KEETON ET AL., supra note
142, at 778-79. For critical commentary on the law pertaining to defamation of the dead,
see Lisa Brown, Note, Dead But Not Forgotten: Proposals for Imposing Liability for
Defamation of the Dead, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1525, 1525-42 (1989). See also Florence Frances
Cameron, Note, Defamation Survivability and the Demise of the Antiquated "Actio Per-
sonalis" Doctrine, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1833-48 (1985) (criticizing the courts' refusal
to allow survivor actions in defamation).
215. See Feinberg, Rights, supra note 200, at 59.
216. Feinberg, Harm and Self-Interest, supra note 200, at 306.





222. Id. at 58.
223. Partridge, supra note 200, at 264.
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"harming the dead" because the dead "have no interests and are be-
yond both harm or benefit."2 He states that while we may talk
"'elliptically' or figuratively about the 'interests of the dead,' ... such
talk is senseless""' because interests cannot persist beyond the exis-
tence of the interest bearer.
Although agreeing with the premises of Feinberg's first two ar-
guments, Partridge rejects the conclusions.' With respect to
Feinberg's distinction between subjective satisfaction and objective
fulfillment of desires, Partridge argues that "objective conditions are
'interests' only insofar as they matter to someone,"22 7 and conse-
quently "[d]eath cancels not only the possibility of satisfaction but
also the very point of fulfillment."' Responding to Feinberg's argu-
ment concerning relational interests, Partridge points out that once a
person no longer has the capacity to gain or lose from a relationship,
he or she can no longer be affected.229 Thus, the relational interest
that connects a person's life to the lives of others who may be re-
moved in time and place is extinguished upon death.'
Partridge finds Feinberg's third argument the most plausible, al-
though he remains unpersuaded.2 31 He agrees that there is no
significant difference between wronging the dead and wronging live
persons who are, and always will be, absolutely unaware of and unaf-
fected by the wrong.2 2 Seeing no grounds for distinguishing between
these two groups, Partridge notes that one must either state that both
groups are harmed or that neither is harmed. 3 On the basis of his
previous arguments, Partridge concludes, somewhat reluctantly, that
neither is harmed.' Partridge's hesitation in reaching this conclusion
stems, in part, from his concern that failing to acknowledge that the
unaffected live person is harmed may lead to a denial that such acts
of libel are morally wrong. 5 He suggests that rather than invoking
the paradoxical and problematic notion of causing "harm" to those
who are unaware of the wrong, we should attempt to find other
224. Id. at 244.
225. Id. at 247.
226. See id. at 246-49.
227. Id. at 247.
228. Id. at 246.
229. See id. at 248-49.
230. See id.
231. See iUL at 250-53.
232. See id. at 250-51.
233. See id. at 251.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 252.
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In examining what other grounds may exist for protecting the
reputation and honoring the wishes of the deceased, Partridge makes
the important point that surviving parties have a personal interest in
respecting the dead. 7 If wills can be violated with impunity on the
rationalization that a dead person is unable to suffer harm, then no-
body can have an expectation of security concerning their own
posthumous wishes.m In the absence of assurances that their wishes
will be respected there is little incentive for people to make wills at
all. Under such circumstances, the living would be deprived of the
satisfaction of providing for persons and institutions about which
they care." Partridge concludes that respecting the wishes of the de-
ceased serves the interests of the living, because it enables the living
to "support their own expectation that they may make plans of their
own on this basis." Without confidence that testimonial directions
will be respected, he argues that there are significant costs, both to
testators and their would-be beneficiaries. 4'
Under both Partridge's and Feinberg's approaches, the wishes of
the deceased concerning posthumous procreation would be re-
spected. Partridge's observation that the mental well-being of the
living is promoted by a system that honors the wishes of and com-
mitments to the dead finds support in the respect accorded by the law
to wills and contracts intended to be carried out after death. By up-
holding these arrangements, the law acknowledges that most people
find it important to attempt to control certain post-mortem events.
Thus, although Partridge is unwilling to concede that the dead are
harmed, he does accept the societal importance of protecting the
stated interests of the living in matters occurring after death.
With regard to the concept of "harming the dead," this Article
agrees with Feinberg that certain acts committed after a person's
death can harm that individual's interests, despite the fact that the
person no longer exists and is therefore unaware of the occurrence.
Feinberg's contention seems intuitively correct. For example, if a
person is murdered while asleep, that individual's interests have been
harmed in the sense that the victim is deprived of future opportuni-
ties and experiences, despite the fact that he or she was never
236. See &L
237. See id. at 254-61.
238. See id. at 260-61.
239. See id. at 261.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 260-61.
9391997]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
conscious of his or her demise.2' Furthermore, Feinberg's argument
seems well supported by the example of defamation. A posthumous
event that destroys a deceased person's reputation harms the de-
ceased's interest because it affects adversely the way that individual is
remembered after death, at which point the individual no longer has
the opportunity to set the record straight. Conversely, it can also be
said that a posthumous award that enhances an individual's reputa-
tion after death promotes the interests of the deceased. Even though
the deceased is unaware of the accolades, as a society we believe it is
important that achievements of a person we consider outstanding in
life be appropriately remembered and honored in death. While it
could be argued that posthumous awards serve a societal interest in
promoting socially desirable behaviors, it could equally be main-
tained that the existence of posthumous awards constitutes an
implicit recognition that certain interests survive the death of the in-
terest holder.
Opponents of Feinberg's view may counter that the common-
law's rejection of actions for defamation of the dead 43 and its refusal
to entertain survivor actions in defamationM constitute an acknowl-
edgment that the law does not recognize posthumous interests.
However, the law in this area should not necessarily be interpreted as
undermining Feinberg's point. It is clear that an interest can be af-
fected negatively, even though no legal remedy exists. For example,
in Feinberg's hypothetical concerning a person who is-and always
will remain-unaware that he or she has been defamed in some re-
mote part of the country, there is no legal remedy. Yet, it can be
maintained that, despite the person's lack of awareness, his or her
interests have been harmed because he or she is now held in lesser
regard by certain people.2 Furthermore, the rule against imposing
242. On the more general issue of murder as posthumous harm, see Levenbook, supra
note 200, at 409-16 (arguing that when a person's interest in staying alive is invaded by an
act of murder, the loss is one that occurs at the moment of death rather than the moment
before death, even though at the moment of death the person no longer exists).
243. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 142, at 778-79 (describing the law relating to
defamation of the dead).
244. Under this common-law rule, a defamation suit commenced while the plaintiff is
alive but still unresolved at his or her death, cannot be continued by the deceased's estate
or by any other person on behalf of the deceased. See Cameron, supra note 214, at 1834-
35.
245. The same point can be made with reference to other torts protecting dignitary
interests, such as battery. In battery, awareness by the plaintiff of a harmful or offensive
bodily contact is not required at the time the contact is made. For example, a battery can
occur even if an individual "is asleep or under an anaesthetic." See KEETON ET AL., supra
note 142, at 40. If the individual never becomes aware of the nonconsensual contact, ob-
[Vol. 75940
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liability for defamation of the dead2 is motivated by entirely differ-
ent policy considerations than exist in posthumous procreation. The
defamation rule is arguably justified by a concern that a contrary rule
would unduly burden historians, and that there would be a conse-
quent" 'chilling' effect of historical reporting."'247
Given that different considerations obviously are implicated in
posthumous procreation than in defamation, it would be somewhat
disingenuous to attempt to argue against the existence of posthumous
interests by using defamation as an analogy. Rather, we need to ex-
amine the policy concerns specific to posthumous reproduction in
order to identify the relevant interests in this context, and determine
how the law should protect these interests.
This Article, then, will explore the nature of the interests at
stake when the deceased has previously expressed an objection to
posthumous procreation or when the deceased's wishes are unknown.
Since different issues are raised by the posthumous use of gametes
than by the posthumous use of embryos, these two contexts will be
considered separately in Parts IV and V respectively.
viously no legal action will be brought since there is no plaintiff to bring suit. Yet, it could
still be argued that the person's interests were harmed. The individual's dignity may have
been violated, despite his or her lack of awareness of the contact.
246. The rule itself seems somewhat anomalous. Although one of the rationales for
the refusal by courts to entertain defamation of the dead claims is that "a personal right
of action dies with the person" ("actio personalis moritur cum persona"), the characteriza-
tion of a person's interest in reputation as a "personal" rather than a "property" right is
perhaps rather arbitrary, given that defamatory statements may have an adverse eco-
nomic effect upon the deceased's estate. See Brown, supra note 214, at 1530 n.26, 1533-
34.
Moreover, the common-law rule disallowing survivor actions in defamation may be
criticized as doing little to advance the deterrent function of tort law. See Cameron, supra
note 214, at 1842. In addition,
[m]any jurisdictions, while not permitting defamation survivability, allow sur-
vival of such highly personal claims as privacy, breach of promise to marry, false
imprisonment, and medical malpractice. As the MacDonald court wondered:
"Why should a claim for a damaged leg survive one's death, where a claim for a
damaged name does not?"
Id. at 1840 (footnotes omitted). The court in MacDonald went on to observe that "[a]fter
death, the leg cannot be healed, but the reputation can." MacDonald v. Time, Inc., 554 F.
Supp. 1053, 1054 (D.N.J. 1983)
247. Brown, supra note 214, at 1541 (noting that since historians often must rely upon
"reasonable speculation, documents that no longer exist, or reports from witnesses who
are no longer alive," the fear of litigation and high damage awards may inhibit historical
writing, with consequent detriment to the public).
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IV. THE RIGHT TO AVOID PosTHuMous PROCREATION USING THE
DECEASED'S GAMETES
A. When the Deceased's Objections Are Known
When an individual has explicitly objected to posthumous pro-
creation and a family member nevertheless wishes to use the
deceased's gametes for reproductive purposes, whose interest should
be granted priority? Some may argue that while the deceased's in-
terests may indeed be harmed by using his or her gametes, not to
allow use of this material harms the living person's interest in procre-
ating, and further, that the living should take priority because they
are the ones who will enjoy the benefits and endure the burdens of
their decision.
Professor Robertson maintains that in deciding whether explicit
directives in favor or against posthumous reproduction should be
followed, we need to assess the meaning and importance that con-
trolling procreation after death has for the living individual. He
states:
In situations in which the individual had given explicit direc-
tions concerning posthumous reproduction, one might think
that the principle of reproductive autonomy should control.
But the right to control posthumous reproduction follows
from the principle of reproductive autonomy only if post-
humous reproduction implicates the same interests, values,
and concerns that reproduction ordinarily entails.248
He then makes the following observation about directives against
posthumous procreation:
[T]he desire to make and have directives against posthu-
mous reproduction enforced would not appear to implicate
significantly the values accorded the desire to avoid repro-
duction. No unwanted gestation or childrearing will occur.
Individuals will never know that they have had offspring,
and thus will not experience anxiety about the welfare of
their offspring or the fear that a person will knock on their
door claiming to be their child. At most, they will have the
certainty that no children will be born after they die and
they are no longer around to see, rear, or worry about
them.
249
Robertson then contends that "this attenuated interest in
248. Robertson, supra note 1, at 1031.
249. Id. at 1032.
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avoiding reproduction does not appear to implicate the core interests
involved in most situations of avoiding reproduction, and arguably
should not be valued to the same extent that interest is valued for
living persons."2''
However, a comparison of the interest in avoiding posthumous
procreation after death with the corresponding interest in the case of
a live individual reveals that while the two interests are quite differ-
ent in nature, both are weighty. Although a person who has a child
posthumously obviously will have no rearing responsibilities and,
consequently, will not have any ongoing emotional or social relation-
ship with the child, the fact that a person will not be present to
experience the manifold emotions and events associated with parent-
hood does not mean that he or she has no interest in preventing
procreation. To foist parenthood upon an individual after death
knowing that this contravenes the deceased's explicit wishes infringes
upon the autonomy of the pre-mortem individual, by depriving him
or her of control over a highly significant interest. Given that our
present law in organ donation gives primacy to the deceased's known
objections over the contrary wishes of the deceased's family,"1 a for-
tiori the law should honor the autonomy of the deceased who objects
to becoming a biological parent after death. As noted earlier, the
decision to avoid procreation would seem to affect the shape of a
person's life-or how that life is remembered-more profoundly than
does the decision to donate organs. z2 Moreover, it would be ironic
indeed if the law were to protect pre-mortem wishes regarding the
disposition of property, but ignore pre-mortem wishes concerning a
matter as central to a person's identity as the desire not to create an-
other human being. Disregarding an individual's objections to
posthumous procreation can constitute a significant harm to the in-
terests of that deceased person and cannot be justified by reference
to the procreative interests of the living.
Partridge's and Feinberg's views can both be understood as sup-
250. Id.; see also Gilbert, supra note 5, at 554-55. Gilbert, discussing circumstances
where a woman wishes to procreate using the deceased's sperm and no evidence exists
regarding the deceased's intent, states that
the court should ... balance her interest in having the decedent's child with the
other party's interest in avoiding a posthumously conceived child. Since the
woman wishing to exercise her right to procreate will usually be most directly af-
fected by any consequences of the post-mortem insemination, her interest
should be given more consideration.
Id. at 555.
251. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 186-99 and accompanying text.
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porting the proposition that when an individual makes known a clear
objection to posthumous procreation, this statement should be re-
spected. As noted earlier, while the two philosophers clearly
disagree as to whether the dead can be harmed, they agree that hon-
oring commitments to the dead supports the interests of the living. 21
Partridge arrives at this conclusion by emphasizing the "self-
regarding and egoistic" motivation for respecting the dead-
namely, that each of us would want to be similarly treated when we,
in turn, die. Feinberg, on the other hand, perceives the issue more in
terms of "keeping faith with the dead,"' 5 arguing that violating a
commitment to the dead constitutes a breach of a duty by the living
that would trouble a "morally sensitive" person."
Moreover, applying Feinberg's analytical structure, it is not only
the living who suffer when the deceased's body is utilized by the fam-
ily for procreation in violation of the deceased's wishes. The
deceased's interests are also harmed. If one accepts Feinberg's thesis
that interests survive the existence of the interest-bearer, to cause the
deceased to become a biological parent without his or her consent
arguably constitutes a harm to the deceased's interests because it
violates an individual's right to control his or her reproductive legacy.
While posthumous defamation-the example used by both Fein-
berg and Partridge-can seriously affect the way in which a person's
life is remembered, posthumous procreation carried out contrary to
the progenitor's wishes recasts the content and contours of the de-
ceased's life in a way that could have even greater impact than
defamation. Feinberg's point concerning relational interests is par-
ticularly apposite in this context. The use of an individual's
reproductive material for posthumous procreation significantly af-
fects the way that individual's life is remembered and regarded by the
decedent's community and family-not least by the resultant child.
Posthumous reproduction can alter in ways emotional, psychological,
and financial the relationship between the deceased and any offspring
253. See supra notes 217-22,237-41 and accompanying text.
254. See Partridge, supra note 200, at 262.
255. See Feinberg, Rights, supra note 200, at 58; cf Callahan, supra note 200, at 347
(claiming that compassion for or moral outrage on behalf of the dead because of an event
that takes place post-mortem "are not genuine moral convictions at all," but rather are
"sentiments which are to be accounted for psychologically"); Partridge, supra note 200, at
262-63 (arguing that this sense of duty to the dead is "the result of a complex structure of
moral explication and justification" which may be relevant from the perspective of the
"moral agent" but which is irrelevant from the perspective of the "moral spectator and
legislator").
256. Feinberg, Rights, supra note 200, at 58.
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already in existence. Since people, in a sense, do live on through
their children, a legal system which allows others to override a per-
son's express wish to avoid procreation takes away from the deceased
the right to be the conclusive author of a highly significant chapter of
his or her life. To disregard the deceased's prior objections is to
obliterate interests that were critical to the person prior to death.
Under such circumstances, posthumous procreation is coercive and,
consequently, undesirable. As the dead are powerless to protect
themselves, the law has a vital role in safeguarding interests that were
important to them while they were living.
B. When the Deceased's Intent Is Ambiguous
The more complex case occurs when the deceased has neither
specifically authorized nor objected to posthumous procreation. Un-
der such circumstances, the UAGA model would vest decision-
making authority regarding the donation of organs in the deceased's
family members.' The question that needs to be addressed is
whether the UAGA model should apply to situations where intent is
unknown in posthumous procreation.
When a person has neither authorized nor objected to posthu-
mous conception, the living may speculate as to what the deceased's
wishes in this matter might have been, but they cannot declare these
wishes with any certainty. In such circumstances, one might argue
that a request to use the deceased's gametes for procreation should
be granted, since there is a possibility that such use would have been
consistent with the deceased's wishes had those wishes been ex-
pressed. Alternatively, one could claim that using the deceased's
gametes without his or her authorization constitutes a societal harm,
because it violates legitimate expectations held by the living as to the
disposition of their bodies after death, and thereby harms all living
persons. This argument needs to be separated into two parts, one
addressing the concerns that arise when gametes are harvested from
a dead person's body without the deceased's prior authorization, and
the other addressing the issues involved when a family member
wishes to use the deceased's cryopreserved gametes for procreation
without prior consent.
1. Posthumously Harvested Gametes
If it is important to the mental well-being of the living that the
257. For criticism of the authority the UAGA vests in the deceased's family, see Quay,
supra note 187, at 904-07.
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wishes of the dead be honored, the deceased's gametes should not be
harvested unless there is evidence establishing that this was the de-
ceased's desire. Moreover, if it is important to individuals to be
assured that their express wishes will be respected after death, it is
surely also important to them that their bodies not be used in a man-
ner that is inconsistent with their legitimate assumptions. Given that
posthumous conception is not the usual procedure to which a dead
body is subjected, it cannot be inferred that an individual's silence on
the matter signifies consent.28 As one philosopher, Professor Paul
Quay, has stated in the context of organ donation, "[w]hen the de-
ceased has given no indication to the contrary, the presumption
should be that he wished his corpse to be treated as were those of his
ancestors" and "[i]f... no evidence exists to show that the deceased
has chosen to forego the treatment of his corpse customary to his re-
ligious and cultural background, there is no basis for any of his
relatives attempting to take that decision to themselves."'' 9 The no-
tion that others may utilize our bodies after our death in ways which
we had not expressly authorized-or perhaps even contemplated-is
likely to arouse considerable anxiety on the part of many living per-
sons. Quay observes that "[t]he deepest roots of the unconscious are
touched by what is done or permitted to be done with human re-
mains."'  He notes that "[t]hough a person's death is, of all that
happens to him, that in which he is most alone, it always and every-
where arouses the strongest sort of social interest and initiates
complex responses of communal activity ... .,,26. Consequently, a
deep human need exists-evident across cultures and throughout the
ages-to provide a "decent" burial and to treat the dead with respect
and reverence~2 Arguably, therefore, if the state allowed family
members to utilize the gametes of the dead for procreation without
the deceased's consent, the lack of assurance that individuals would
have about the fate of their own body parts could be a source of ap-
prehension to the living.'
258. An analogy could be drawn here to contractual principles. In contract law, an
offeree's silence is not generally to be construed as an acceptance. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 69 (1981).
259. Quay, supra note 187, at 920.
260. Id. at 904.
261. Id. at 900.
262. See id. at 900-04. See generally E. Sidney Hartland, Death and Disposal of the
Dead, 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHiCs 411 (1911) (describing the customs
and rituals associated with the disposition of dead bodies in a variety of cultures through-
out history).
263. According to one report, Kathleen Nolan, a bioethicist, made the emotionally
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Moreover, it is questionable whether allowing next of kin to
make use of the deceased's body parts for their own procreative pur-
poses without the deceased's consent accords proper respect to the
dead. As discussed earlier, the "quasi property" rights that the law
came to vest in the deceased's family are in the nature of a "sacred
trust," imposing upon the family the obligation to provide a decent
burial for the deceased.' In granting the family these limited rights,
the law did not intend to provide the next of kin with a mandate to do
with the cadaver whatever they wished. On the contrary, the family's
rights were carefully circumscribed, as the label "quasi property"-
rather than "property"-suggests. The family was selected as the ob-
vious candidate because of the "natural bonds of familial piety, of
fidelity to promises made to the deceased, and of reverence for him
and his memory. ''
The family's "quasi property" right was expanded by the UAGA
with regard to organ donation because it vests authority in the family
to make the donation decisions when the deceased's wishes are un-
known."' This extension of the family's authority is arguably justified
by the compelling societal interest that exists in organ donation, in
saving lives and alleviating suffering.27 However, as noted earlier,
there is no corresponding compelling state interest in posthumous
procreation.'
The family's role in posthumous procreation differs from its role
in organ donation and in burial decisions. Most importantly, family
members have a much greater personal stake in the outcome of pro-
creative decisions than they do in decisions concerning organ
donation or burial. While it is true that in the latter two contexts
family members benefit psychologically if their wishes are satisfied,
charged statement that" '[o]btaining sperm from the dead is almost like rape.'" Davis,
supra note 18, at C1 (quoting Nolan). While rape arguably constitutes a far more serious
invasion of a person's interests than posthumous conception without consent-and No-
lan's statement therefore could be criticized as having the (doubtless unintended) effect
of diminishing the seriousness of rape-the analogy nevertheless speaks to a sense of
moral outrage when a person uses his or her position of superior power or authority to
invade the bodily integrity of another. This is so even if, as in posthumous procreation,
that "other" is no longer living.
264. See Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 242-43 (1872);
supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
265. Quay, supra note 187, at 901.
266. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
267. The family may, of course, refuse to donate the deceased's organs. However, a
system which vests decision-making authority in the family is likely to acquire a greater
number of cadaveric organs than a system of "presumed non-consent," which vests deci-
sion-making authority exclusively in the individual now deceased.
268. See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
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their gain in these contexts is far more limited in its ramifications
than in posthumous procreation, which carries enduring psychologi-
cal, emotional and financial implications. Moreover, the family
member who seeks access to the deceased's body parts for procrea-
tive purposes without the deceased's consent does so for reasons that
are likely to be motivated by self-interest. Although, in some cases,
the impetus for harvesting the deceased's gametes for procreation
may be a sense of loyalty to and reverence for the deceased rather
than the gratification of the living, in the majority of instances the
motivation is likely to be the family member's-rather than the de-
ceased's-wish to have a child. Thus, the initial rationale for granting
family members "quasi property" rights-namely, to enable family
members to treat the corpse in a manner consistent with their
"intrafamilial obligations.., of piety, fidelity, and personal rever-
ence"' 9-- would give way to a right that would allow the next of kin
to invade the deceased's bodily integrity for their own personal inter-
est.
2. Posthumous Use of Cryopreserved Gametes
When gametes have been cryopreserved prior to the individual's
death, using the gametes without the deceased's prior authorization
does not implicate the deceased's right to bodily integrity. Never-
theless, the deceased's right to avoid procreation is involved here to
the same extent as when gametes are harvested from a dead body. If
there is a relevant difference between the two situations, it relates to
the bearing that cryopreservation has upon the question of the de-
ceased's intent. If no other evidence exists as to that person's wishes,
can consent to posthumous conception be inferred from the fact that
a person had gametes cryopreserved?
In most cases, this question has little practical significance, be-
cause it is usual practice for the fertility clinic storing the
cryopreserved gametes to require that depositors specify at the outset
their wishes regarding the disposition of their material in case of
death.2° However, if gametes are stored without such directions and
a family member wishes to gain control of them for procreative pur-
poses, the law must decide whether the family member's desire to
procreate should take precedence over the unknown wishes of the
deceased."'
269. Quay, supra note 187, at 905.
270. See Robertson, supra note 1, at 1035.
271. See, e.g., Parpalaix v. CECOS, T.G.I. Creteil, August 1, 1984, Gazette du Palais
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In his examination of the competing interests in posthumous re-
production, Robertson states that "[a] person's interest in
posthumous reproduction exists only if she focused on the possibility
and found sufficient meaning in reproducing after death to make a
directive about it. '22 Robertson goes on to say that "[w]ithout an
explicit prior oral or written directive, the predeath interest of the
deceased is not directly involved, and other interests or concerns may
be given priority."2  Robertson concludes:
In the absence of the deceased's directions for or against
posthumous reproduction, the interests of a spouse or a
partner in reproducing with the deceased's gametes or em-
bryos ... must then be considered. If such a person has a
property or quasi-property dispositional right over those
factors, that person's own rights to procreate or not will be
directly implicated. The competing interests of existing off-
spring and heirs, notions of morality, respect for the dead,
respect for fetuses and embryos, and even the prior wishes
of the deceased about posthumous reproduction may all
have to yield to the claims of the person who wants to use
those factors to reproduce. Questions of posthumous re-
production thus give way to the present reproductive
interests of living persons.7
However, it is not clear why the absence of a written directive
should be viewed as evidence that the deceased's interest in avoiding
posthumous procreation is weak. Robertson seems to assume that
the absence of a directive for or against posthumous reproduction
signifies that the individual concerned did not feel strongly about the
possibility of posthumous reproduction. However, this assumption is
unwarranted. While it may be true that a person who desired post-
humous reproduction probably would have made a written or oral
directive to that effect, the same is not necessarily true of a person
who wishes to avoid posthumous reproduction.
Since posthumous reproduction is not common in modern soci-
ety, there is no reason to expect people opposed to the practice to
make their objections known. Rather than placing the onus on the
individual, a "default rule" should apply, whereby what is presumed
is that which is usual, unless the individual has made an explicit
choice to the contrary.s Until such time as posthumous reproduc-
[G.P.], Sept. 15, 1984, at 11 (discussed in Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 5, at 229-33).
272. See Robertson, supra note 1, at 1033.
273. Id. at 1034.
274. I&
275. An analogy may be drawn to the principle of interpretation expressed in the Uni-
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tion becomes the norm, it is fair to proceed upon the assumption that
most people do not expect that their gametes will be used after their
death. Thus, while persons should have the opportunity to indicate
their wishes in favor of posthumous procreation by means of an oral
or written directive, in the absence of such a directive the status quo
should apply.
In considering the relevance of cryopreservation to the estab-
lishment of an intent to procreate posthumously, it might be asked
why else an individual would cryopreserve gametes, if not with the
intention of using them for procreative purposes at some future
point.'  It is reasonable to assert that people who cryopreserve their
gametes constitute a subset of the population holding potentially dif-
ferent expectations than many who have not done so. At the very
least, the decision to cryopreserve gametes indicates a willingness to
intervene in the procreative process by utilizing technological assis-
tance. Moreover, it signifies that the individual has considered the
possibility of procreating in the future.
However, it cannot be assumed that a person who has cryopre-
served his or her gametes has contemplated-let alone agreed to-
posthumous procreation. In other words, while there may be a gen-
eral intent to procreate in the future and to do so by employing
technological means, the act of cryopreservation, by itself, does not
provide evidence of an intent to procreate under all and any circum-
stances, including after death. For example, it is quite likely that a
person may store gametes in anticipation of undergoing chemother-
apy, with the aim of using those gametes if the treatment were
successful in controlling the disease.' It cannot be concluded, how-
ever, that the individual has acquiesced to what is arguably an
entirely different set of circumstances, namely that a child should be
brought into existence when one of the biological parents is de-
ceased.'
form Commercial Code, which provides: "[A]ny usage of trade in the vocation or trade in
which [the parties] are engaged or of which they are or should be aware give particular
meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement." U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1995).
Thus, what is usual in the trade is considered 4n interpreting the meaning of the agree-
ment the parties have made.
276. See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 5, at 246 (noting that "if the very act of
depositing the sperm can be seen as an indication of intention, then the very failure of a
man who knows he is dying to leave precise instructions should also be interpreted as an
indication of posthumous intent").
277. See Winkel & Fossum, supra note 16, at 40.
278. It may be particularly difficult to establish an intent in favor of posthumous pro-
creation when the deceased is a woman, because consent then must be inferred not only
to the birth of a child after the woman's death, but also to the implantation of the
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When an individual has left no instructions regarding the post-
humous use of cryopreserved gametes for procreation, silence ought
not to be construed as consent. Since the consequences of posthu-
mous procreation are very serious in the way they affect core values
that the individual held while alive, the onus should not be on the in-
dividual to state opposition to posthumous procreation. While it is
possible that a decedent desiring posthumous reproduction may have
left no evidence of his or her wishes, a presumption against posthu-
mous procreation imparts a message that before a person's body
parts can be used in a matter as significant as procreation, the indi-
vidual must have provided an affirmative assent.
It may be contended that requiring positive evidence of consent
to posthumous procreation is unfair, because such a requirement ex-
cludes those individuals who have no objection to posthumous
conception but who simply did not authorize this procedure explic-
itly. However, it is difficult to see why it is any more fair to presume
consent on the part of those who have contemplated posthumous
conception but who decided against it while omitting to record their
objections for posterity. A system that seeks clear consent would, at
least, accurately represent the intentions of those in this latter group.
Respect for a person's autonomy requires that an individual's
body or body parts not be utilized without that individual's prior con-
sent, especially when the consequences of doing so have a profound
effect upon that individual's interests. Therefore, even if common
usage were to change so that posthumous procreation became a more
frequent practice, a presumption against the unauthorized use of
gametes after death nevertheless would represent a very important
statement about the value of bodily integrity and self-determination.
C. Evidence of Intent When Gametes Are Harvested or Have Been
Stored
If specific evidence of the deceased's intention to procreate
posthumously is required, what form should this evidence take? Is a
written directive necessary, or should other forms of evidence suffice,
and if so, what kind of evidence is sufficient?
An analogy that may be helpful here is the law relating to living
woman's reproductive material in another woman.
In this context, it should also be noted that when the surviving partner who wants to
procreate is male, he will require the assistance of either a "surrogate," or, if he has
formed a subsequent long-term relationship, his new partner, for gestation. Considera-
tion of the legal and ethical issues involved in the practice of surrogacy lie beyond the
scope of this Article.
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wills authorizing or prohibiting the withdrawal of medical treatment
for incompetent patients. Living wills and directives authorizing or
prohibiting posthumous procreation share a common central issue:
the nature and extent of decision-making authority vested in family
members to make critical decisions on behalf of an individual who
can no longer speak for him or herself. When an incompetent patient
is terminally ill, courts have articulated a number of different tests for
allowing a surrogate to make decisions on behalf of the patient con-
cerning the withdrawal of treatment.2 9 One of these tests is the
"substituted judgment" standard, under which the decision regarding
withdrawal of medical treatment must be based, as far as possible, on
the patient's own subjective values and wishes. ° To ascertain these
wishes, the surrogate decision-maker must look at any and all avail-
able evidence, such as prior written or oral statements, evidence
relating to the patient's philosophical and religious beliefs, and any
prior consistent pattern of conduct by the patient regarding medical
care. Although the standard purports to be based on the patient's
actual subjective intent, in the absence of clear evidence as to this
intent, courts have often "permitted surrogate decisionmakers to
consider a variety of factors from which the incompetent patient's
subjective intent can be inferred. ' 'H
A strict standard was applied by the Missouri Supreme Court in
Cruzan v. Harmon,' a case involving a family's request for the with-
drawal of treatment for a woman who had suffered permanent brain
damage. The court held that prior statements by the individual ex-
pressed several years earlier were "unreliable for the purpose of
determining her intent" and insufficient to support the claim of sub-
stituted judgment.' On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court, which held that a state may require
continued treatment of an incompetent patient in the absence of
"clear and convincing" evidence of the patient's prior, competent re-
fusal of treatment.'
279. See generally ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 257-90 (1989) (discussing the
best interests, substituted judgment, and tripartite standards for allowing surrogate deci-
sion-making).
280. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 429-
31 (Mass. 1977); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976), rev'g 348 A.2d 801 (N.J.
Ch. 1975).
281. MEISEL, supra note 279, at 272.
282. 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988), affid sub nom. Cruzan v. Director of Mo. Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
283. See id.
284. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280-85. The Supreme Court did not hold that states must
[Vol. 75
POSTHUMOUS PROCREATION
If the deceased's interests are to be safeguarded adequately in
posthumous reproduction, a high standard of evidence of an intent to
reproduce after death ought to be required. The risk exists in these
cases, as in withdrawal of treatment cases, that a family member may
apply his or her own values, rather than attempt to ascertain what the
individual would have wanted. Just as family members may have a
financial conflict of interest in withdrawal of treatment cases, in post-
humous reproduction the family may have a strong procreative
interest which may or may not coincide with the interest of the de-
ceased. Thus, the temptation may be very great for family members
to portray the deceased's values and desires regarding posthumous
conception in ways that serve their own interests in procreation.
A serious and specific oral statement indicating an individual's
desire to procreate posthumously should be sufficient to satisfy the
evidentiary standard. Requiring a written statement may be unduly
burdensome for many individuals-especially those whose socio-
economic position makes legal consultation less probable-and, con-
sequently, the outcome may be inconsistent with the actual wishes of
those individuals. In light of the potential that exists for a conflict of
interests on the part of the family, a "clear and convincing" standard
of evidence of the deceased's prior wishes-satisfied either by a writ-
ten or oral statement-is preferable to a substituted judgment
standard.
V. POSTHUMOUS PROCREATION USING CRYOPRESERVED
EMBRYOS
In the course of undergoing in vitro fertilization (IVF),' couples
often create more embryos than are immediately needed.m Typi-
cally, these "excess" embryos are cryopreserved, pending a decision
as to whether they will be transferred to the woman's uterus, donated
adopt a "clear and convincing" standard, but merely ruled that it was constitutional for a
state to do so. See id.
285. IVF is a process in which a woman's eggs are extracted from her ovaries, placed
in a culture in a glass dish, and fertilized with semen. See INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at
123. When the resulting embryos reach the two to sixteen cell stage, they may be trans-
ferred to the woman's uterus. See id. See generally BONNICKSEN, supra note 30, at 147-
51 (describing the in vitro fertilization technique).
286. "Excess" embryos result because, to increase the efficiency of the IVF process,
the woman's ovary is hyperstimulated so that more eggs can be retrieved and thus, more
embryos created. Several embryos may be transferred to the uterus in one cycle or, al-
ternatively, the extra embryos may be frozen and used in a later cycle. This procedure
avoids the necessity of the woman having to undergo egg retrieval on multiple occasions if
implantation of the embryo is unsuccessful. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF
CHOICE 99 (1994).
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to another individual or couple, used for scientific research, or de-
stroyed by thawing. Most IVF programs require couples to sign a
form stating their wishes concerning the disposition of their embryos
in case of divorce, dispute, or death of one or both individuals.'"
However, if no evidence of an agreement exists, there may be consid-
erable uncertainty regarding the wishes of the deceased gamete
provider. Moreover, even if the couple has clearly stipulated that, in
the event of the death of either partner, the remaining embryos
should be destroyed, the surviving partner may feel differently about
this matter once his or her partner has died.
The posthumous use of embryos for procreation presents a dif-
ferent set of concerns than does the posthumous use of gametes, for
two major reasons. First, whereas one person produces gametes, two
people combine their gametes to create embryos. Thus, one person's
decision regarding procreation with an embryo created from his or
her gametes directly affects the reproductive autonomy of the other
gamete provider. Second, embryos represent a more fully developed
form of potential life than gametes. As such, they have a powerful
symbolic significance which inspires strong views regarding their
posthumous use.'
As most fertility clinics routinely ask a couple at the outset to
stipulate their wishes as to the disposition of their embryos in the
event of the death of one or both of them, it is likely that the prior
wishes of the deceased in this matter will be known. A conflict could
arise when the parties had originally agreed that all remaining em-
bryos be destroyed in the event of death, but the surviving partner no
longer wishes to maintain that agreement. Alternatively, the parties
may never have explicitly stated their desires regarding the fate of
the embryos in the case of death. A further possibility is that no
agreement exists because the parties may have been unable to re-
solve their different views about the disposition of the embryos in the
event that one of the parties dies. It is critical, then, to consider the
relevant criteria to be used in weighing the different interests in each
of these scenarios, if the surviving partner now wishes to implant the
embryo(s)."
287. See Robertson, supra note 1, at 1045-46.
288. See STEINBOCK, supra note 91.
289. It is also possible, of course, that both parties who created the embryo may die
before the embryo is implanted. This situation occurred in 1983 when Mario and Elsa
Rios from Los Angeles, were killed in a plane crash leaving their two frozen embryos in
Melbourne, Australia. A controversy ensued over whether the embryos should be im-
planted, and whether any resulting children should be considered heirs to the sizable
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A. When the Deceased's Wishes Are Known
With regard to gametes, this Article has maintained that allow-
ing the surviving partner to reproduce by using the deceased's
gametes contrary to the deceased's prior wishes constitutes a post-
humous harm in that it deprives the deceased of an opportunity to
control his or her procreative legacy. It was earlier argued that, when
the right not to procreate is at issue, the fact that the partner who
wishes to avoid procreation is dead does not significantly diminish
the harm that is done to that individual's interests if his or her wishes
are disregarded.' ° Similarly, when a surviving partner wishes to use
an embryo for procreation contrary to the deceased's prior wishes,
resolution of this conflict should not be achieved simply by conclud-
ing that the interests of the dead are less important than those of the
living. Rather, the interests involved ought to be weighed with refer-
ence to the same principles that apply in a conflict over the use or
non-use of IVF embryos when both progenitors are alive.
The United States Supreme Court, in a series of decisions con-
cerning abortion and contraception, has clearly acknowledged the
constitutional right of living persons to avoid procreation.29' The
Court has long recognized the central significance that bearing and
rearing a child represents for individuals and couples, and has
granted constitutional protection to the decision to become a parent
through sexual intercourse.! However, the Court has not yet deline-
ated the constitutional boundaries of the right to procreate when
reproduction takes place by means of reproductive technologies.293
Only two state courts thus far have considered how a conflict be-
tween the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation might
be resolved when a couple who has created embryos through WE
estate left by the Rioses. The Victorian Legislature enacted a law prohibiting the destruc-
tion of the Rioses' embryos. See Cate, supra note 5, at 1067-68. The issues arising from
such "orphan embryo" cases lie beyond the scope of this Article.
290. See supra notes 248-84 and accompanying text.
291. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
452-53 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484-86 (1965).
292. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (declaring the law
"settled ... that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a per-
son's most basic decisions about family and parenthood"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972) (stating that "deference" and "protection" should be given to a parent's
interest in his children); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invalidating a law
compelling the sterilization of criminals and holding that the right to procreate "is one of
the basic civil rights of man"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 393 (1923) (holding that
the concept of "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment includes "the right of the individ-
ual.., to marry, establish a home and bring up children").
293. See ROBERTSON, supra note 286, at 29-30.
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cannot agree upon the disposition of those embryos.
In Davis v. Davis,2 4 which involved a dispute in a divorce pro-
ceeding regarding the disposition of seven frozen embryos,295 there
had been no discussion between the parties concerning the disposi-
tion of the embryos in the event of divorce.26 Mrs. Davis testified
that she was unaware that there were any problems in the marriage,
whereas Mr. Davis testified that he had known that their marriage
was "not very stable" but had hoped that it would be improved by the
birth of a child.29' After the Tennessee trial court granted custody of
the embryos to Mrs. Davis,29" and the court of appeals held that
Mr. and Mrs. Davis should have joint control over the embryos, 2,9 the
case reached the Tennessee Supreme Court.m In deciding that the
embryos should be destroyed as requested by Mr. Davis, the supreme
court offered an analytic framework to resolve disputes concerning
the "custody" of frozen embryos created through IVF. The court
suggested that the following guidelines should apply when no prior
agreement between the parties exists:
[T]he relative interests of the parties in using or not using
the preembryos must be weighed. Ordinarily, the party
wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that
the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving
parenthood by means other than use of the preembryos in
question. If no other reasonable alternatives exist, then the
argument in favor of using the preembryos to achieve preg-
nancy should be considered. However, if the party seeking
control of the preembryos intends merely to donate them to
another couple, the objecting party obviously has the
greater interest and should prevail."'
294. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
295. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (discussing details of the case).
296. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592.
297. See id. The court noted that Mrs. Davis's testimony was contradictory as to
whether she would have proceeded with IVF had she known that the marriage was unsta-
ble. The court observed that
[a]t one point she said if she had known they were getting divorced, she would
not have gone ahead with it, but at another point she indicated that she was so
committed to the idea of being a mother that she could not say she would not
have gone ahead with cryopreservation.
Ild. at 592 n.10.
298. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *11 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
1989).
299. See Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13,
1990).
300. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588.
301. Id. at 604.
[Vol. 75
POSTHUMOUS PROCREATION
In concluding that Mr. Davis's interest in avoiding parenthood
outweighed Mrs. Davis's interest in donating the embryos, the court
placed great emphasis on Mr. Davis's testimony that he had suffered
psychologically from his lack of opportunity to establish a close rela-
tionship with his parents and did not want his child to experience
similar burdens.2 While acknowledging Mrs. Davis's emotional and
physical investment in the IVF process,"' the court gave this factor
relatively little weight as compared with Mr. Davis's psychological
testimony. The court stated that if Mrs. Davis had been unable to
pursue any other options for achieving parenthood, and if she had
wished to have the embryos implanted in herself rather than donate
them to another couple, "[t]he case would be closer."' ' The court did
not, however, indicate how it might resolve this hypothetical situa-
tion.
In the case of Kass v. Kass,3° also involving a dispute regarding
extracorporeal embryos in a divorce proceeding, a New York trial
court presented a significantly different analysis. Granting Mrs. Kass
the right to have the embryos implanted in herself, the Supreme
Court of Nassau County, New York reasoned that if a husband can
neither compel his wife to have an abortion or prevent her from so
doing, then neither can he have any control over the procreative
process when the fertilization occurs in vitro.3 In the court's view,
there exists "no legal, ethical or logical reason why an in vitro fertili-
zation should give rise to additional rights on the part of the
husband."' Thus, the court concluded, "[t]o deny a husband rights
while an embryo develops in the womb and grant a right to destroy
while it is in a hospital freezer is to favor situs over substance." 38
However, the claim by the court in Kass that the distinction be-
302. See id. at 603-04.
303. The court had noted the extraordinary measures taken by Mrs. Davis in order to
successfully complete the IVF procedure:
Despite her fear of needles, at each 1VF attempt Mary Sue [Davis] underwent
the month of subcutaneous injections necessary to shut down her pituitary gland
and the eight days of intermuscular injections necessary to stimulate her ovaries
to produce ova. She was anesthetized five times for the aspiration procedures to
be performed. Forty-eight to 72 hours after each aspiration, she returned for
transfer back to her uterus, only to receive a negative pregnancy test result each
time.
Id. at 591-92.
304. See id. at 604.
305. No. 19658/93, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995).
306. See id. at *2-3.
307. Id at *3.
308. Id
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tween in vivo and in vitro fertilization is merely one of "situs" rather
than "substance" is open to challenge. Arguably, the distinction has
an important impact both on the interests of the respective gamete
providers and on the interests of the state. When the embryo is in
vivo, the woman's right to bodily integrity is involved. As the United
States Supreme Court stated in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,'
where it held unconstitutional a state law requiring the husband's
consent before an abortion could be performed, "[i]nasmuch as it is
the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more di-
rectly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the
two, the balance weighs in her favor."3 ' By contrast, when fertiliza-
tion takes place outside the woman's body, no gestational interest is
involved, and consequently, the male and female gamete providers
stand on equal footing.
One response to this argument could be that although no gesta-
tional interest is involved when embryos are in vitro, the woman
makes a very substantial physical and emotional investment, since
she undergoes a far more invasive and painful experience in the IVF
process than does the man. Some may criticize the court in Davis for
giving insufficient weight to this difference in the physical experi-
ences of men and women in IVF."' However, while the physical
demands that IVF places upon women should by no means be dis-
counted, it is not clear that this fact alone should result in automatic
veto power for the woman,312 regardless of whether she wishes to
have the embryos implanted or destroyed. Other important interests
must also be considered, namely, the interest of the state, and the in-
terest of the other person who contributed to the creation of the
embryo.
Although, as noted in Part I, embryos are not considered
"persons" under current constitutional law, they constitute potential
human life which the state has an interest in protecting.3 Arguably
309. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
310. M at 71.
311. One commentator argues that the physical burdens and risks to which a woman is
subject in IVF "speak strongly for an argument recognizing IVF procedures as part of a
woman's right to control her bodily integrity," and that this consideration, while not con-
trolling, should add "weight to the argument of a female partner who wishes to implant
embryos she helped to create." Tanya Feliciano, Note, Davis v. Davis: What About Fu-
ture Disputes?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 305, 347-48 (1993); see also supra note 303 (describing
the procedure undergone by Mrs. Davis).
312. See Robertson, supra note 60, at 476 n.95.
313. See Andrews, supra note 90, passim (analyzing the legal status of the embryo);
Robertson, supra note 60, at 450-54 (same); supra notes 86-111 and accompanying text
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the state's interest in protecting potential human life is different
when fertilization takes place outside, rather than inside, the body.
Views may vary, however, as to whether the state's interest in pro-
tecting an embryo is greater or less when the embryo is in vitro rather
than in vivo. On the one hand, it may be argued that the state's in-
terest in protecting extracorporeal embryos is relatively weak,
because the embryo is at such an early developmental stage. In con-
trast, an embryo in the uterus embarks upon a developmental process
which, if successful, culminates in a live birth. The state's interest in
the growing fetus becomes compelling once the fetus has passed cer-
tain developmental milestones.314 While an extracorporeal embryo
does constitute a unique genetic identity, its development is so pre-
liminary that the state's interest may be, as the court in Davis
observed, "at best slight."
315
On the other hand, however, it may be claimed that in the case
of extracorporeal embryos, no competing interest exists to outweigh
the state's interest in protecting potential life. In abortion cases,
courts have recognized embryos in vivo as "potential life," but have
concluded that, although the state has an interest in protecting poten-
tial life, this interest may be outweighed by the woman's interest in
bodily integrity.36 However, in the case of extracorporeal embryos,
since no competing gestational interest is involved, the state's interest
in protecting potential life may be viewed as strong. Although em-
bryos do not have the status of "persons, 317 they may still be
regarded as having an intrinsic value which calls for the state's pro-
311tection.
(discussing the various ethical positions regarding the status of embryos).
314. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973).
315. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602.
316. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,846-53 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S.
at 150-56.
317. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
318. Professor Ronald Dworkin's insights into the abortion controversy may be illumi-
nating here. In describing the "intellectual confusion" apparent in the public debate on
abortion, Dworkin points out a "crucial distinction" which people on both sides of the
abortion issue have failed to recognize. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMINION 11
(1993). Dworkin distinguishes between the claim "that fetuses are creatures with inter-
ests of their own right from the start, including preeminently, an interest in remaining
alive, and that therefore they have the rights that all human beings have to protect these
basic interests, including a right not to be killed," and the claim that "human life has an
intrinsic, innate value; that human life is sacred just in itself; and that the sacred nature of
a human life begins when its biological life begins, even before the creature whose life it is
has movement or sensation or interests or rights of its own." Id. Dworkin states that the
confusion between these two claims has made the abortion debate more confrontational
than necessary, and that "[t]he disagreement that actually divides people is a markedly
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Even if the state has an interest in protecting extracorporeal em-
bryos on the grounds that permitting the destruction of potential
human life is a tragic waste, the autonomy interest of the individual
who, while alive, objected to the use of the embryo for procreation
must still be weighed against the state's interest. As discussed ear-
lier,319 forcing a person to become a biological parent against his or
her will represents a serious violation of that person's procreative
interests. Depriving an individual of control over a decision as cen-
tral to a person's identity as that of becoming or not becoming a
biological parent constitutes a major infringement upon that individ-
ual's autonomy which, it is reasonable to posit, outweighs the state's
interest in protecting potential human life.
Yet, the question still remains as to the relative significance to be
accorded to the deceased's right to avoid procreation after death as
against the surviving party's desire to procreate. If the persons cre-
ating the embryo agreed when they participated in the IVF
procedure that their cryopreserved embryos would not be used for
procreation in the event of the death of either party, and the surviv-
ing partner has now changed his or her mind, a strong case can be
made for enforcing the original agreement. Since the parties created
the embryos with the expectation that these embryos would be used
for procreation only under specified circumstances, and since they
may not have participated in the process had their expectations been
otherwise, it is unfair to allow the surviving partner to pursue a
course of action which contradicts the original intentions of the par-
ties.
When no agreement exists and the deceased's objections to the
use of his or her embryos after death are known, the situation is
analogous to that in Davis.3 o One possible approach is to follow the
guidelines set forth by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis,
whereby a presumption exists in favor of the party wishing to avoid
procreation unless the other party has no alternative reproductive
opportunities. 1 While this approach has the advantage of providing
a somewhat flexible, case by case analysis, it is problematic because it
sets forth a rather vague, uncertain standard, and entails a risk that
the exception to the holding will undermine the holding itself."
less polar disagreement about how best to respect a fundamental idea we almost all share
in some form: that individual human life is sacred." Id. at 13.
319. See supra notes 248-56 and accompanying text.
320. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)
321. See id. at 604.
322. See Jennifer L. Carow, Note, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an
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Moreover, there seems little justification for allowing one partner to
use the embryos for reproduction when the other partner's objections
are known, in circumstances of either divorce or death. Just as an
individual's "right to procreate" with other living individuals is not
unlimited in its scope but is contingent upon the consent of the other
person involved, so too there should be no "right to procreate" by
using an embryo created by a now deceased person who, while alive,
expressed her objection to posthumous procreation.
The claim could be made, however, that a person who allows
gametes to be used to create an embryo should be assumed to have
consented to the use of that embryo for procreation, including pro-
creation under changed circumstances. The court in Kass argued
along these lines, stating that when Mr. Kass entered the IVF pro-
gram he knew or should have known that "the possibility and
probability of a delayed implantation [were] very real," and that his
initial consent "should not be abolished nunc pro tunc merely be-
cause of a change in circumstances which could and should have been
anticipated."'3" The court referred to "the obvious conclusion that a
'right to avoid procreation' cannot logically survive the initial act of
procreation."32 4 This conclusion is "obvious," however, only if one
ignores-as the court in Kass did-the difference between in vivo
and in vitro fertilization. While it is true that a man who engages in
sexual intercourse is held legally responsible for a resultant child de-
spite the fact that he may have had no intention to procreate,3' the
legal rules that govern procreation resulting from sexual intercourse
should not necessarily apply to procreation achieved through the new
reproductive technologies?. When an unintended pregnancy results
from sexual intercourse, the law regards the man as having implicitly
consented to this risk by consenting to sexual intercourse. In other
words, the man's intent regarding the pregnancy is regarded as irrele-
Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Procreational Freedom and Reproductive Technology,
43 DEPAUL L. REV. 523,564-69 (1994).
323. Kass v. Kass, No. 19658193, 1995 WL 110368, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18,1995).
324. Id.
325. Courts have held a man in this situation financially liable for the resultant child,
even when the woman intentionally misled him regarding her use of contraceptives. See,
e.g., Erwin L.D. v. Myla Jean L., 847 S.W.2d 45,47-48 (Ark. 1993); Beard v. Skipper, 451
N.W.2d 614, 615 (Mich. 1989); L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1983);
Hughes v. Hutt, 455 A.2d 623,625 (Pa. 1983).
326. Cf. Gilbert, supra note 5, at 553 (claiming that since a man who impregnates a
woman through sexual intercourse is liable for child support even when the woman gives
birth against his wishes or without notifying him, a man's lack of willingness to father a
child post-mortem should not override a woman's right to procreate posthumously since
the man's interest in avoiding fatherhood is weaker after death than during life).
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vant. However, a critical distinction between procreation achieved
by sexual intercourse and procreation by means of reproductive
technologies lies precisely in the fact that in the latter context, intent
plays a critical role. Whereas in coital reproduction, the intention to
parent is often formed ex post facto as a result of a biological reality,
in reproductive technologies individuals are able to exercise consid-
erable control in advance of any biological consequences."z When
gametes or embryos have been frozen, the parties can suspend their
decision concerning whether or not to proceed with procreation. To
assert that once a person has embarked upon the reproductive proc-
ess by creating extracorporeal embryos, he or she must proceed to
bring those embryos to term is to fail to acknowledge the high degree
of choice and control that current reproductive technologies offer.
Since intentions play such a critical role in reproductive tech-
nologies, the parties' intentions with regard to embryos resulting
from the IVF process are highly relevant. A person who provides
gametes to create an embryo has not irrevocably consented to the
possibility of that embryo being brought to term under any and all
circumstances. Although there was obviously consent by both parties
to create an embryo, there was not necessarily consent to reproduce
under specific circumstances, in this case, death. Thus, where no
agreement exists and the deceased's objections to the use of the em-
bryos are known, posthumous procreation using those embryos
should not be permitted.
It could be argued that since the individual who objected to the
use of the embryos is dead, his or her interests should be given less
weight than those of the surviving partner. One might distinguish
between circumstances of death on the one hand and divorce on the
other, and claim that a stronger case exists for respecting the desire
of the party wishing to avoid procreation in divorce, because that
person will have to endure the psychological, emotional and financial
consequences of having a child, whereas the deceased will not. How-
ever, as discussed in the context of gametes,3 the fact that a person
after death lacks awareness does not mean that his or her interests
have not been harmed. This Article has argued consistently that a
person's interest in avoiding biological parenthood should not be
viewed as significantly diminished after death.29
327. See Marjorie M. Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood"
An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297,308-10.
328. See supra notes 251-56 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 248-84 and accompanying text.
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B. When the Deceased's Wishes Are Unknown
When a person has contributed to the creation of an embryo, but
has provided no indication as to his or her desires regarding the dis-
position of that embryo in the event of death, how should that
person's silence be interpreted if he or she dies and the surviving
partner wishes to use the embryo for reproduction? The fact that
two live persons have taken the necessary steps to create an embryo
is strong evidence that both persons had an intent to procreate.
However, while creating an embryo more clearly evidences an intent
to procreate than does the collection of gametes without fertilization,
it does not necessarily establish an intent to procreate posthumously.
It cannot be inferred that a deceased person who created an embryo
without authorizing posthumous implantation would necessarily de-
sire that the embryo be brought to term under such conditions.
However, given that two persons are involved in the creation of
an embryo, the deceased's lack of intent to procreate is not necessar-
ly determinative. Since the surviving partner has contributed
genetically to the embryo in as significant a way as the deceased, his
or her procreative desires also must be taken into account. At this
point, it becomes relevant to consider whether the surviving partner
wishes to rear the resultant child, or wishes to donate the embryo to
another couple. A person's reproductive interest arguably should be
given more weight in the former situation than in the latter, because
the willingness to rear a child manifests a long term emotional, psy-
chological, physical and financial commitment on the part of the
biological parent.
In circumstances where the surviving partner wishes to raise the
child, a far stronger case can be made for implanting and bringing the
embryo to term than in the corresponding situation concerning gam-
etes. Although the deceased's intentions regarding posthumous
procreation are unknown-and thus may or may not denote acquies-
cence-the wishes of the other gamete provider who wants to
procreate are clear. While this Article has argued that in the case of
sperm or eggs, only the individual who provides the gametes should
have the authority to decide whether posthumous procreation should
take place, a different conclusion is appropriate where embryos are
concerned and the deceased's wishes are unknown. In contrast to the
situation where the deceased's objections to posthumous procreation
using his or her embryos are known with substantial certainty, when
the deceased's wishes are unknown there exists only a risk that the
deceased may have been opposed to posthumous reproduction. If
posthumous procreation is not allowed when the deceased's wishes
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are unknown, the interests of the surviving partner who wishes to
procreate will always be harmed, and the interests of the deceased
will sometimes be harmed. On the other hand, if posthumous repro-
duction is permitted, only one person's interests will sometimes be
harmed. Thus, given that there is a possibility that the deceased may
have agreed to posthumous procreation using his or her embryos,
combined with a certainty that the other gamete provider wants to
proceed, the balance seems to tip in favor of allowing posthumous
procreation.
CONCLUSION
Decisions concerning the use of reproductive material after a
person's death focus attention on how we view our commitments not
only to future generations, but also to those who have preceded us.
To discharge faithfully our obligations to those who no longer exist,
we need to honor express prior objections by the dead to the post-
humous use of their gametes for reproduction. Even though, after
death, a person presumably has no appreciation of the experience of
parenthood, the contravention of stated instructions against posthu-
mous procreation violates a very significant procreative right,
namely, the right of an individual to control his or her genetic legacy.
When evidence as to a person's intentions regarding posthumous
use of his or her gametes is lacking, posthumous procreation should
not be permitted. Given that posthumous procreation by harvesting
a deceased person's gametes is not the manner in which a dead body
is usually treated, an individual's failure to make a directive against
this outcome ought not to be construed as consent. Even when a per-
son has cryopreserved his or her gametes, it cannot be inferred from
this fact alone that he or she would have authorized posthumous re-
production. While cryopreservation may indicate a general intent to
procreate at some future point, it says nothing about a decision to
procreate under the very specific circumstance of death. A presump-
tion against posthumous reproduction in the absence of clear
evidence to the contrary constitutes an important statement about
the value that should be placed upon an individual's right to bodily
integrity and self-determination.
As in the case of gametes, the deceased's prior objection to the
posthumous use of an embryo created with his or her gametes should
be respected. However, when the deceased's wishes regarding post-
humous reproduction with his or her embryo are unknown, a
stronger case can be made for permitting the surviving partner to use
the embryo for reproduction than in the corresponding case with
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gametes. Since the surviving partner's genetic contribution to the
creation of the embryo is as significant as the deceased's, his or her
procreative intentions must also be heeded. The possibility that the
deceased might have consented to use of the embryo, combined with
the certainty of the other gamete provider's wishes, suggests that
there may be more reason to allow posthumous procreation involving
embryos under these circumstances than to disallow it.
Despite the finality of death, the relationship of the living to the
dead does not altogether cease with the grave. To some extent, it
continues on through the actions of the living as they carry out the
last wishes of the dead. When these wishes regarding posthumous
procreation are unknown, respect for individual autonomy and dig-
nity requires that the deceased's body should not be used in a way
that, in all probability, was not contemplated and certainly was not
authorized by the deceased while alive. Acting to fulfill the wishes of
the dead is a special relational trust placed into the hands of the liv-
ing. In the area of procreation, fulfilling such wishes preserves the
shape of the human legacy envisaged by the deceased in life. There is
perhaps no greater way that the living can honor the dead than by
safeguarding the pre-death intentions of those who are now deceased,
in a matter as fundamental as procreation.
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